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EVALUATING JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT IN THE 
CURRENT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CLIMATE: THE NEED TO 
STRENGTHEN IMPROPRIETY STANDARDS AND REMOVAL 
REMEDIES TO INCLUDE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND 
COMMUNITY HARM 
Joshua E. Kastenberg* 
In 1964, Richard Hofstadter published “The Paranoid Style in 
American Politics” in Harper’s Magazine in which he characterized 
the United States’ political life as being immune from the more 
egregious effects of class conflict.1  Hofstadter was one of the 
twentieth century’s foremost American History scholars, and he 
argued that the fact that the United States did not turn to fascism or 
communism during the twentieth century’s crisis times stood as a 
testament to the nation’s institutional strengths.2  Yet, he also noted 
that politics served “as an arena for uncommonly angry minds” and 
in turn, this enabled a “small minority” to possess ample political 
leverage so that their “animosities and passions” were incorporated 
by one of the nation’s two major political parties.3  Using 1964 
presidential contender, Senator Barry Goldwater’s supporters as an 
example, Hofstadter contended that one of the central characteristics 
of the “small minorit[ies]” was their insistence that the nation’s elites 
had persecuted them, and whether or not the majority understood 
this to be true, they too were the victims of the persecution.4  
 
* Professor Joshua Kastenberg teaches criminal law and criminal procedure at the 
University of New Mexico, School of Law.  Prior to joining the faculty he served over two 
decades in the United States military, and also was a trial judge over a criminal court, where 
he adjudicated well-over 200 felony trials. 
1 See Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, in THE PARANOID STYLE 
IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 3 (1996) [hereinafter The Paranoid Style]. 
2 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 325–26 (1989); 
David Greenberg, Richard Hofstadter’s Tradition, ATLANTIC (Nov. 1998), https://www
.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/11/richard-hofstadters-tradition/377296/. 
3 The Paranoid Style, supra note 1, at 3. 
4 See id. at 3, 23–24.  See generally Richard Hofstadter, Goldwater and Pseudo-Conservative 
Politics, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 
93–141 (exploring Goldwater’s views as compared to other twentieth-century conservatives).  
See ROBERT DAVID JOHNSON, ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ: THE 1964 ELECTION 67–69 (2009), for 
further explanation of Goldwater’s platform and his follower’s embracement of an anti-
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Although Hofstadter noted that there were “angry” historical 
movements across the political spectrum, the modern right wing’s 
adherents—as he termed them in 1964—believed themselves 
dispossessed, and their country having been taken from them.5  
Similar themes were expressed by President Donald Trump in the 
2016 presidential campaign.6 
Hofstadter wrote in broad themes and he focused on the nation’s 
broad political system rather than a component part of it, such as the 
population’s relationship to a branch of government.7  His 
observations and conclusions remain relevant today, though it is 
worthwhile to analyze the effect and relationship of a “small 
minority” to a particular branch of government.8  In this regard, there 
is question as to whether the fifty state judicial branches are 
internally policed to minimize the possibility that modern “right 
wing” populism will undermine judicial independence and 
impartiality.  Although political scientists will define modern 
populism differently,9 for the purpose of this Article, the United 
States’ current experience with populism includes sweeping 
resentments against minority groups (and in particular immigrants 
from non-European regions), political elites, and attacks on long-
standing political institutions.10  And, as a caveat to this study, 
 
establishment ideology.  Among other aspects of his campaign, Goldwater promised to 
withdraw the United States from the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union and 
argued that the federal government lacked the authority to end segregation.  JOHNSON, supra 
at 67. 
5 The Paranoid Style, supra note 1, at 3, 23.  During the early Cold War, to Right Wing 
allegations during the Cold War that the Supreme Court had gone soft on communism or 
coddled criminals.  See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 
474–75 (2000) (highlighting Nixon’s attack on the Court for being weak on crime); Nadine 
Strossen, Freedom of Speech in the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 
68, 79 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996) (discussing the Warren Court being attacked by anti-
Communists and being accused of Communist influence). 
6 See Mark Mellman, Mellman: The Revolt of the Dispossessed, HILL (Nov. 29, 2016), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/mark-mellman/307971-mellman-the-revolt-of-the-dispossessed. 
7 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE 
OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840 52 (1970); Richard Hofstadter, The Pseudo-
Conservative Revolt—1954, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS, 
supra note 1, at 44–45, 49. 
8 See Nils Gilman, Revisiting Hofstadter’s Populism, AM. INTEREST (May 2, 2018), https://
www.the-american-interest.com/2018/05/02/revisiting-hofstadters-populism/. 
9 See Daniele Albertazzi & Duncan McDonnell, Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre, 
in TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY POPULISM: THE SPECTRE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY 1, 3 
(Daniele Albertazzi & Duncan McDonnell eds., 2008); David Landau, The Limits of 
Constitutionalism: Populist Constitutions, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 524-25 (2018). 
10 See MARTIN A. SCHAIN, TRANSATLANTIC COUNCIL ON MIGRATION, SHIFTING TIDES: 
RADICAL-RIGHT POPULISM AND IMMIGRATION POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 1 
(2018); John Batt, American Legal Populism: A Jurisprudential and Historical Narrative, 
Including Reflections on Critical Legal Studies, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 651, 760-61 (1995); Conor 
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similar concerns would be raised if a modern “left-leaning” populism 
had succeeded in national politics.11 
The problem of public trust in a fair judiciary is not new.  In 1970, 
Chief Justice Warren Burger observed, “A sense of confidence in the 
courts is essential to maintain the fabric of an ordered liberty for a 
free people.”12  While this statement may be nothing more than 
aspirational, Burger warned that when “people who have long been 
exploited . . . come to believe that courts cannot vindicate their legal 
rights from fraud,” an “incalculable damage [is done] to society.”13  It 
could be added that “exploitation” includes influencing people to 
deflect attention from the actual sources of exploitation to imaginary 
or tangential sources, which also may do damage to judicial 
institutions.14 
A number of state supreme courts have held that judicial service 
requires a judge not only to be “learned in the law,” but also to 
adjudicate cases or appeals in a fair and impartial manner.15  When 
a judge takes an oath of office, he or she accepts a mandate of 
performing judicial duties in a conscientious and impartial manner.16  
The impartiality requirement is both ancient and embedded in 
American jurisprudence.17  The judicial duty of impartiality also 
extends to both actual impartiality and the appearance of 
 
Friedersdorf, What Right-Wing Populist Movements Share: Blaming Immigrants, ATLANTIC 
(June 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/what-right-wing-
populist-movements-share-blaming-immigrants/532023/. 
11 See Tom Ginsburg et al., The Limits of Constitutionalism: The Coming Demise of Liberal 
Constitutionalism?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 239, 241 (2018); Cas Mudde, The Problem with Populism, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/17/problem-
populism-syriza-podemos-dark-side-europe; see also Joshua Kurlantzick, So You Thought the 
Global Populist Wave Was Ebbing? Think Again., WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/02/16/so-you-thought-the-global-populist-
wave-was-ebbing-think-again/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bea0859b5352 (explaining the 
possible spread of Populism through democratic elections because of the pushback against the 
“mainstream parties”). 
12 Chief Justice Warren Burger, The State of the Judiciary—1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 934 
(1970). 
13 Id. 
14 See Elvia R. Arriola, Democracy and Dissent: Challenging the Solomon Amendment as a 
Cultural Threat to Academic Freedom and Civil Rights, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 149, 159 
(2005); see also In re Abrams, 257 P.3d 167, 174 (Ariz. 2011) (“Nothing threatens public 
confidence in the courts and the legal system more than a judge who abuses his power and 
exploits the prestige of his office for personal benefit.”). 
15 In re Inquiry Concerning Justice Court Judge William E. Bailey, 541 So. 2d 1036, 1039 
(Miss. 1989); see, e.g., In re Shilling, 415 N.E.2d 900, 903 (N.Y. 1980). 
16 Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct 1656, 1666 (2015); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Heitzler, 
291 N.E.2d 477, 482, 484 (Ohio 1972); In re Barr, 13 S.W.3d 525, 557 (Review Tribunal of Tex. 
1998). 
17 See, e.g., McGuire v. Blount, 199 U.S. 142, 143 (1905); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523, 
537 (1869). 
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impartiality.18  While the oath of judicial office may appear to be a 
simple ministerial act, the current political and cultural climate of 
“right-wing” populism has brought forth the possibility that judicial 
standards of conduct as embodied in oaths are, in some instances, not 
enforceable to a degree that will preserve the impartiality mandate.19 
It should not be doubted that the public has an interest in an 
impartial judiciary.  In 2015, the Supreme Court determined, in 
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar that a state can “prohibit judicial 
candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds.”20  The 
compelling interest for Florida was the preservation of public 
confidence in an impartial judiciary.21  Florida’s Supreme Court 
justices and appellate court judges are appointed by a system of 
“merit selection,” but its trial judges are elected by popular vote.22  
Florida’s statute preventing trial judges from soliciting campaign 
donations was challenged as a First Amendment violation.23  The 
majority of the Court noted that while it is difficult to give “precise 
definition” to public confidence in the judiciary, public confidence is, 
nonetheless, a compelling interest.24  This decision, however, relates 
to the financial conduct of judicial candidates.25  Moreover, there is a 
tension between Williams-Yulee and the Court’s 2002 decision, 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.26  In White, the Court 
determined that judicial campaign speech is constitutionally 
protected unless there is a compelling state interest to curtail such 
speech.27  White arose from a challenge to Minnesota’s rule 
prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing positions on matters 
likely to come before the courts.28  Both Williams-Yulee and White, 
however, narrowly focus on limitations placed on election campaigns 
and not on disqualification challenges arising from personal conduct 
 
18 See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)); Williams-Yule, 135 S. Ct. at 469 (Harlan, J., concurring); Nationwide 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 F.3d 801, 805 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States 
v. Hickman, 592 F2d. 931, 933 (6th Cir. 1979)). 
19 See Sabrina Siddiqui, Kavanaugh’s Angry Testimony Raises Doubts over Future 
Impartiality, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/oct/02
/kavanaugh-impartial-justice-testimony. 
20 Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1672 (2015). 
21 See id. at 1671. 
22 See id. at 1662. 
23 See id. at 1664. 
24 Id. at 1667, 1671. 
25 See id. at 1662. 
26 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
27 See id. at 774–75, 788. 
28 See id. at 768, 776–77. 
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once a judge has assumed her or his judicial position.29 
This Article focuses on judicial conduct, rather than the narrower 
category of campaign speech, though campaign speech may, in many 
instances, be thought of as a subset of conduct.  It also examines 
impropriety standards in a proposed holistic model.  This model 
should not be interpreted to limit judicial independence in decision 
making, but it proposes that state disciplinary commissions and state 
supreme courts incorporate procedural justice and community harm 
concepts into their investigative and determination processes.  Part I 
of this Article presents an examination of the current common 
frameworks shared by the states for addressing judicial conduct 
appealing to popular social and political influences.  Included in this 
section is an analysis of the interrelationship between implicit bias 
and impropriety, as well as on community harm and procedural 
justice.   
Part II provides both a historical and contemporary analysis of 
“populism,” including the effect of populism on the nation’s judiciary.  
This section provides an argument for why historic models of 
populism provide only minor guidance for addressing the current 
wave of populism’s impact on the courts.  Namely, not only are there 
fundamental ideological differences between the prior populist 
movements, ascertaining lessons from the past can easily devolve 
into presentism, or put another way, the use of the past to ratify the 
present.30  In essence, this section concludes with the admonition that 
the phrase “we have experienced this before,” is not a solution to 
judicial bias.   
Part III then examines the effect of judicial behavior and populism 
in three areas of concern.  These are: racially derogatory conduct by 
judges; demeaning conduct in regard to gender such as sexual 
harassment; and, discrimination against gays, lesbians, and 
transgendered persons (hereafter LGBT).  The Article concludes with 
the argument that because judicial behavior, whether on the bench 
 
29 Compare Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1662 (“In an effort to preserve public confidence in 
the integrity of their judiciaries, many of those States prohibit judges and judicial candidates 
from personally soliciting funds for their campaigns.”) (emphasis added), with White, 536 U.S. 
at 768 (“Since 1974, [Minnesota judges] have been subject to a legal restriction which states 
that a ‘candidate for judicial office . . .’ shall not ‘announce his or her views on disputed legal or 
political issues.’”) (emphasis added). 
30 See DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL 
THOUGHT 135 (1970).  However, according to legal historian and distinguished scholar, G. 
Edward White, presentism is inevitable and complete objectivity nearly impossible in the field 
of legal history.  See G. Edward White, Recovering the World of the Marshall Court, 33 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 781, 818 (2000). 
EVALUATING JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 9/17/19  5:03 PM 
1500 Albany Law Review [Vol. 82.4 
or off, which is derogatory to persons on the basis of race, national 
origin, gender, LGBT status, or other protected classes creates a 
community harm which makes fair and impartial trials less likely, 
removal sanctions should be more readily accepted. 
Concededly, there are crucial considerations in advancing an 
argument that the removal or long-term suspension of a judge from 
hearing all, or even a class of cases.  Judicial removal and suspension 
are drastic acts that can have the effect of impeachment without a 
formal legislative process.31  That is, the removal or long-term 
suspension of a judge negates the intent of the political branches of 
government when judges are appointed, or the will of a state’s voters 
in terms of elected judges.32  Secondly, freedom of speech is a principle 
right of all citizens, and there must be a compelling reason to place 
limits on this right.33  Finally, some state constitutions permit 
permanent removal, and others only enable temporary suspension.34  
This makes the achievement of a national standard difficult.  
Although this Article is premised on the theory that judicial 
impartiality is a compelling reason, it must be acknowledged that a 
majority of the Court in White, did not agree that the reason was 
compelling enough to curtail election speech.35  Finally, there is an 
underlying principle of judicial ethics that judges have a duty to 
adjudicate cases.36 
Although this Article concentrates on state judiciaries, it is 
important to understand that the federal judiciary is no less impacted 
by political and social currents.  And, it should also be noted that the 
federal judiciary may serve as a barometer of judicial conduct to the 
state judiciaries.  At present, there are 673 district court judges and 
 
31 See Michael L. Buenger, Of Money and Judicial Independence: Can Inherent Powers 
Protect State Courts in Tough Fiscal Times?, 92 KY. L.J. 979, 1017–18 (2003). 
32 See Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm’n v. Woods, 25 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Ky. 2000); In re James, 
821 N.W.2d 144, 158 (Mich. 2012); In re Roca, 173 A.3d 1176, 1198 (Pa. 2017) (Donohue, J., 
dissenting).  But see In re McCree, 845 N.W.2d 458, 474 n.39 (Mich. 2014). 
33 See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 
9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1067 (1996). 
34 Compare In re Roca, 173 A.3d at 1190 (“Against such backdrop it was not unreasonable 
for the [Court of Judicial Discipline] to conclude that Appellant’s removal [and permanent bar] 
from the bench was an appropriate sanction in light of all of the facts of the case.”), with In re 
Watkins, 757 S.E.2d 594, 607 (W. Va. 2013) (affirming the recommendations of the Judicial 
Hearing Board’s recommendation to suspend a judge as a result of the judges inappropriate 
behavior). 
35 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). 
36 See United States v. Malmsberry, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (citing 
United States v. Greenspan, 26 F.3d 1001, 1005 (10th Cir. 1994); In re American Ready Mix, 
Inc., 14 F.3d 1497, 1501 (10th Cir. 1994); Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987)); 
Wash. Mut. Fin. Group, LLC v. Blackmon, 2001-CA-01911-SCT (¶ 11) (Miss. 2004). 
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179 courts of appeals judges as authorized by federal law.37  As of 
June 1, 2017, there were fifty-nine women serving as federal court of 
appeals judges.38  Additionally, out of the 160 active appellate judges, 
twenty-one were African-American, fourteen were Hispanic, and five 
were Asian-American.39  “As of June 1, 2017, a total of 194 women 
were serving as U.S. district court judges” (representing 
approximately one-third of the judiciary).40  There were, in addition, 
eighty-one African-American judges, fifty-eight Hispanic judges, 
sixteen Asian judges, and one Native American judge.41  After 
President Trump’s first ten months in office, when combining the 
fourteen confirmations with the fifty-eight pending nominations, his 
judicial selections were ninety-one percent Caucasian, and eighty-
one percent male.42  Given modern American populism’s attack on 
elites, coupled with a promise to return to a majoritarian power, 
President Trump’s public criticism of a United States District Court 
Judge named Gonzalo Curiel, who presided over a lawsuit where he 
was a defendant had a conflict of interest as a result the judge’s 
Hispanic heritage, is lamentably unsurprising.43 
I.  ENFORCING JUDICIAL CODES OF CONDUCT AND SAFEGUARDING 
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY 
Judicial codes of ethics and enforcement mechanisms which 
investigate and recommend sanctions against judges are designed “to 
preserve public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
 
37 See BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43426, U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT 
COURT JUDGES: PROFILES OF SELECT CHARACTERISTICS 1–2 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc
/R43426.pdf. 
38 Id. at 4. 
39 Id. at 5. 
40 Id. at 15. 
41 Id. at 17. 
42 See Catharine Lucey & Meghan Hoyer, Trump Choosing White Men as Judges, Highest 
Rate in Decades, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://apnews.com/a2c7a89828c747ed9439f60e4a8 
9193e; Rorie Spill Solberg & Eric N. Waltenburg, Trump’s Judicial Nominations Would Put a 
Lot of White Men on the Federal Courts, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/28/this-is-how-trump-is-changing-the-
federal-courts/?utm_term=.0808e4aaa6e2. 
43 See Z. Byron Wolf,  Read This: How Trump Defended Criticism of Judge for Being 
‘Mexican’, CNN (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/20/politics/donald-trump-gonzal 
o-curiel-jake-tapper-transcript/index.html; see also William Galston, The Populist Challenge to 
Liberal Democracy, 29 J. DEMOCRACY 1, 11, 12 (2018) (describing populism in modern America); 
Mark Champion, The Rise of Populism, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com
/business/the-rise-of-populism/2019/01/22/dae2fd80-1e06-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html
?utm_term=.652296e88ad0 (last visited Mar. 5, 2019) (describing the populist trends that can 
be seen in President Trump). 
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judiciary.”44  As the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged in 
2001, “members of the judiciary are held to higher standards of 
conduct than members of the public at large and that relatively slight 
improprieties [may] subject the judiciary as a whole to public 
criticism.”45  The ABA code and its state analogs generally address 
the overt acts of judges such as the failure to recuse from an 
adjudication in which the judge has a vested interest in the outcome; 
public speech and conduct which has the potential to undermine 
public confidence in the judiciary; and the unfair treatment of 
litigants.46  It does not appear that any of the state enforcement 
mechanisms directly address standards for when a judge’s conduct 
enforces a community’s implicit bias.47 
Implicit bias can be defined as an unconscious mental process that 
affects social judgments.48  An individual may believe herself or 
himself to be “colorblind,” or equitable in the treatment of others, but 
at the same time have their judgment on another person affected by 
internal assumptions based on race, gender, age, disability, or 
another visibly identifiable trait.49   Usually, a group’s explicit biases 
show less than its implicit biases.50  Judges are by no means immune 
 
44 In re Wilfong, 765 S.E.2d 283, 296 (W. Va. 2014). 
45 In re Going, 761 N.E.2d 585, 589 (N.Y. 2001).  Other state high courts have accepted that 
judges have to be held to the highest standards of conduct.  See, e.g., In re Flanagan, 690 A.2d 
865, 881 (Conn. 1997); In re Inquiry Concerning Gerard, 631 N.W.2d 271, 276–77, 280 (Iowa 
2001).  In Flanagan, the Connecticut Supreme Court determined that although a judge may 
have had a sterling record as a conscientious judge, this did not absolve the judge for 
undermining the appearance of impartiality by having an adulterous affair with a subordinate 
employee.  See id. at 866, 882.  In Gerard, a judge was suspended for sixty days because of his 
dilatory approach to issuing judicial rulings as well as an improper intimate relationship with 
the district attorney.  In re Gerard, 631 N.W.2d 276, 277, 280 (Iowa 2001). 
46 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2, 2.2, 2.11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
47 See, e.g., Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 137, 163 (2013). 
48 See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The 
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 
4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 152 (2010); John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious 
Influences on Judicial Decision-Making: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV 1, 3 
(2010); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 
58 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 465, 473 (2010); Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 
3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 429 (2007); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment 
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001). 
49 See William J. Hall et al., Implicit Racial/Ethnic Bias Among Health Care Professionals 
and Its Influence on Heath Care Outcomes: A Systematic Review, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Dec. 
2015, at e60, e72; see also Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in 
Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 
1474 (1998) (“The data . . . clearly revealed patterns consistent with the expectation that White 
subjects would display an implicit attitude difference between the Black and White racial 
categories.”). 
50 See Gregory S. Parks, Judicial Recusal: Cognitive Biases and Racial Stereotyping, 18 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 681, 686, 696–97 (2015) (“As measured in the context of race, 
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to implicit bias.51  There is tested evidence that people are generally 
able to compensate for their implicit bias when they are aware of it.52  
However, it also appears that there must be an acceptance that 
certain behaviors minimize the value of individuals based on the 
treatment of the individual’s group identity.53  A small number of 
state courts have found that the existence of implicit bias requires 
new approaches to ensuring fair trials.54 
On February 14, 2018, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts reaffirmed, in Commonwealth v. Buckley,55 a long-
standing principle that a police officer’s judgment in effectuating the 
search of a person is an important element to assessing the 
lawfulness of the search, but then considered the impact of implicit 
bias on policing.56  At first glance, there is little surprise to this 
decision.  At approximately 10:50 p.m. on January 25, 2013, police 
officers conducted surveillance of an apartment building they 
suspected of being used for illicit drug activity and then observed the 
defendant and another person drive away from the building.57  The 
headlights of the defendant’s vehicle had not been turned on in 
addition to “traveling above the speed limit,” thereby constituting a 
traffic infraction.58  After making the traffic stop the police officer 
approached the vehicle and upon smelling marijuana subsequently 
asked the defendant if there was marijuana inside the vehicle, as to 
which the defendant said that “she did not think so” but that he could 
check the vehicle.59  After obtaining consent, the police discovered 
cocaine and a firearm.60  The defendant, an African-American male, 
 
whites generally show much more of an explicit preference for whites (40.7% favor) than blacks 
(3.4% favor), especially when compared to other racial groups.  More than half of whites (56.0%) 
show no preference for either group.  At the implicit level, however, whites show a robust 
preference for whites (71.5% favor) over blacks (6.8% favor), with only 21.7% showing no 
preference.  In fact, whites express more in-group favoritism on implicit measures (78.4%) than 
on explicit measures (51.1%).”). 
51 See id. at 696; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial 
Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1208, 1232 (2009). 
52 Id. at 1202–03. 
53 See id. 
54 See PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,  HELPING COURTS ADDRESS 
IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION 6 (2012), http://www.national-consortium.org/~
/media/Microsites/Files/National%20Consortium/Implicit%20Bias/Helping-Courts-Address-
Implicit-Bias.ashx; see also Rachlinski et al., supra note 51, at 1226 (explaining methods to 
combat implicit biases in the criminal justice system). 
55 Commonwealth v. Buckley, 90 N.E.3d 767 (Mass. 2018). 
56 See id. at 770, 776, 777. 
57 Id. at 770. 
58 See id. at 770–71. 
59 Id. at 771. 
60 Id. 
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later challenged the voluntariness of his consent to search his vehicle 
but did not claim that he was racially profiled by the police.61  The 
state justices, however, recognized that there is both an explicit and 
implicit problem throughout the legal system which serves to deny 
minorities the same legal equality as the majoritarian population.62  
Justice Kimberly S. Budd, in her concurrence, went further than the 
majority in noting that law enforcement decisions affected by implicit 
bias, even when made in good faith, stigmatize members of the 
minority population.63 
Two years earlier in Commonwealth v. Warren,64 the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that consciousness of 
guilt evidence—including a person fleeing the police—should be 
given little weight as a determining factor of reasonable suspicion.65  
The justices relied on a study conducted by the Boston Police 
Department which found a pattern of racial profiling by police in the 
city and thus, “suggests a reason for flight unrelated to the 
consciousness of guilt . . . [including] the desire to avoid the recurring 
indignity of being racially profiled . . . .”66  While the state’s highest 
court did not discuss implicit bias, it is clear that the justices were 
concerned that juries would be less likely to believe that innocent 
people would flee from police than fairness required.67  In 2018, one 
justice, in a concurrence, recognized that implicit bias has the 
potential to undermine the right to a fair trial at all stages of a 
criminal trial.68  A Massachusetts court rule now places on judges the 
duty to maximize the opportunity in voir dire to discover implicit 
bias.69 
In 2013 the Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Saintcalle,70 
determined that jury service “is a ground level exercise of democratic 
values.”71  Saintcalle arose from a trial judge’s overruling a 
 
61 Id. at 772, 776–77. 
62 See id. at 777. 
63 See id. at 781 (Budd, J., concurring) (citing Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 833 N.E.2d 590, 
604 (Mass. 2005) (Greaney, J., concurring)). 
64 Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333 (Mass. 2016). 
65 Id. at 341-42. 
66 See id. at 342.  The court held that based on the recent findings of a Boston Police 
Department report documenting a racial profiling pattern, courts should be reticent to accord 
too much weight to a minority member who flees from the police.  See id. 
67 See id. 
68 See Buckley, 90 N.E.3d at 781–83 (Budd, J., concurring) (noting that there is a 
presumption, which the defendant must overcome, that a traffic stop was not based on an 
indefensible standard). 
69 See MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 6. 
70 State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326 (Wash. 2013). 
71 Id. at 337.  One of the important features about Saintcalle, was that the Court pointed 
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defendant’s objection to a prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against 
the sole African-American juror in a criminal trial.72  The state 
supreme court concluded that the “systematic removal” of minority 
jurors not only “cheap[ens] the value of the jury verdict,” it also 
creates “a badge of inferiority” on the state’s minority members.73  In 
other decisions, the Washington Supreme Court determined that 
prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel are susceptible to implicit 
bias.74  Thus, the Washington Supreme Court has extended its bias 
analysis to community harm without naming it as such, which, if 
permitted to continue, has the possibility of eroding fairness in all 
legal functions. 
A.  Judicial Authority and Implicit Bias: Creating a Community 
Harm 
Judges hold a position of trust that is different from officials in the 
state and federal legislative and executive branches.75  Justice John 
Paul Stevens, in his White dissent, pointed out that this position of 
trust remains the same whether a judge is appointed or elected.76  In 
Mistretta v. United States,77 the Court held that the judiciary’s 
legitimacy depends on its impartiality.78  Because of the judiciary’s 
unique status, a judge’s explicit bias may contribute to a jury’s 
implicit bias, if not that of a community.79  A judge who evidences a 
dislike or articulates a disparagement against a particularized group 
of individuals places his or her impartiality into doubt.80  But this 
 
out that not once since Batson had it overturned a conviction based on the peremptory 
challenge.  Id. at 335. 
72 Id. at 329. 
73 Id. at 337. 
74 See State v. Walker, 341 P.3d 976, 991 n.13 (Wash. 2015); see also State v. Jefferson, 429 
P.3d 467, 480 (Wash. 2018) (“[T]hese proffered, racially neutral reasons for striking Juror 10 
seem to lack support in the record.  They reflect differential treatment [by the prosecutor] of 
the sole African American juror, and hence, they ‘could’ support an inference of implicit bias.”); 
State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 635 (Wash. 2018) (“Given the evidence before this court and out 
judicial notice of implicit and overt racial bias against black defendants in this state, we are 
confident that the association between race and the death penalty is not attributed to random 
chance.”); In re Marriage of Black, 392 P.3d 1041, 1052 (Wash. 2017) (“Given the facts of this 
case, the trial court’s improper consideration of Rachelle’s sexual orientation was intertwined 
with an implicit preference for Charles’ religious beliefs.”). 
75 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 797 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
76 Id. 
77 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
78 Id. at 407. 
79 Michael Pinard, Limitations on Judicial Activism in Criminal Trials, 33 CONN. L. REV. 
243, 282 (2000); see Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit 
Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 842–43 (2012). 
80 See Neitz, supra note 47, at 143–44. 
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conduct can also harm the community by creating an environment in 
which the public normalizes prejudicial behavior.81 
The right of confrontation presents one contextual model for 
assessing judicial conduct and community bias.  In criminal trials, 
the right of confrontation is essential for a defendant to uncover a 
witness’ bias or motivations to testify in less than truthful manner, 
as well as uncover a witness’ faulty memory.82  In civil trials, 
although not a Sixth Amendment right, confrontation is nonetheless 
essential to ensure a fair trial because it permits counsel to uncover 
similar biases and motives of witnesses, as well as a witness’ memory 
lapses.83  In situations in which a judge has evidenced overt bias or 
lack of respect against an identifiable group and then limits cross-
examination through the application of relevancy rules, the judge 
may cause the result of his or her trials to be suspect, even in 
instances where the limits are defensible.84 
While the Washington and Massachusetts appellate judiciary 
appears to have taken a lead in considering the effect of implicit bias 
on the whole trial,85 there are a small number of other state appellate 
courts that have accepted that implicit bias may affect trials.86  In 
2012, an Ohio Court of Appeals judge, in a concurring opinion, urged 
that because trial judges were no more immune from implicit bias 
than the community at large, disparities in sentencing constituted a 
basis for appeals.87  In 2017, the Iowa Supreme Court recognized that 
implicit bias exists in juries and that state’s trial courts should be 
proactive in protecting defendants from the dangers of such bias.88 
There is, however, a critical caveat which must be recognized in 
examining the relationship between the judiciary and a community’s 
 
81 See Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 518 (2018). 
82 See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692, 693 (1931) (citing Tla-Koo-Yel-Lee v. 
United States, 167 U.S. 274, 277 (1897); Farkas v. United States, 2 F.2d 644, 647 (6th Cir. 
1924); King v. United States, 112 F. 988, 994 (5th Cir. 1902); People v. Moore, 89 N.Y.S. 83 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1904)). 
83 See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 660 (2014). 
84 See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485 (2008) (citing Hunter v. Underwood, 471 
U.S. 222, 228 (1985)); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that a 
prosecutor violates the Equal Protection Clause when minority members are excluded without 
justification through the peremptory challenge process).  In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete 
Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), the Court extended Batson to civil trials.  See id. at 631 (citing Batson, 
476 U.S. at 96-97).  In Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), the Court further extended 
Batson to prohibit a defense counsel in a criminal trial from excluding prospective jurors on the 
basis of race.  See id. at 59. 
85 See State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 329, 335 (Wash. 2013); MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 6. 
86 See State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 816, 817 (Iowa 2017); In re Gremillion, 2016-0054, p. 
27–28 (La. 6/29/16); 204 So. 3d 183, 199. 
87 See State v. Sherman, 2012-Ohio-3958, at ¶¶ 45, 49 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
88 See Plain, 898 N.W.2d at 817. 
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implicit biases and the adoption of a community harm model.  
Although there is a recognition that implicit bias exists, it would be 
unconscionable to adopt a scheme which enables recusals based on a 
judge’s race, religion, national origin, gender, or other protected class.  
In 1987, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined, in 
United States v. Alabama,89 that the race of a judge coupled with the 
judge’s prior work as a civil rights attorney did not constitute a basis 
for requiring recusal.90  Three years earlier, in a minority-based class-
action suit against the city of Houston, Texas, the city attorney 
motioned an African-American federal judge, Gabrielle Kirk 
McDonald to recuse herself from the case on the basis of her race and 
that she had lived in Houston.91 
The lawsuit arose as a challenge to Houston’s voting scheme and 
while it was true that Judge McDonald shared the same race as the 
plaintiff class, she noted–in charitable terms–that a grant of recusal 
would be a disservice to the law.92  Although Judge McDonald was 
undoubtedly correct in her decision, President Trump’s aspersion 
against Judge Curiel suggests that there remains a strongly-held 
belief that a judge’s decisional processes are fundamentally defined 
by their race, gender, national origin, or other genetic features.93  
Judge McDonald’s refusal to recuse in this instance serves as a 
reminder that adherence to the principle of dedication to the law and 
the refusal to countenance prejudice in a courtroom are both critical 
to the long-term faith in an impartial judiciary.94   
B.  Canon-Based Regulation of Judicial Conduct 
The American Bar Association’s 2010 Canons of Judicial Ethics, as 
in the case of its 1924, 1972, 1990, and 2007 predecessors, were 
 
89 United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987). 
90 See id. at 1542-43 (“The fact that an individual belongs to a minority does not render one 
biased or prejudiced, or raise doubts about one’s impartiality: ‘that one is black does not mean, 
ipso facto, that he is anti-white; no more than being Jewish implies being anti-Catholic, or being 
Catholic implies being anti-Protestant.’”). 
91 See Le Roy v. Houston, 592 F. Supp. 415, 424 (S.D. Tex. 1984). 
92 Id. at 416, 420. 
93 See Z. Byron Wolf, Trump’s Attacks on Judge Curiel Are Still Jarring to Read, CNN (Feb. 
27, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/27/politics/judge-curiel-trump-border-wall/index.html; 
see also Cheryl L. Wade, When Judges Are Gatekeepers: Democracy, Morality, Status, and 
Empathy in Duty Decisions (Help from Ordinary Citizens), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1996) 
(“The judge’s life experience and personal characteristics such as race, gender, sexual 
orientation, and socioeconomic status, inevitably and naturally influence the decision making 
process.”). 
94 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
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issued to guide ethical judicial behavior.95  While the ABA code is not 
enforceable in most state courts, each of the fifty states possess a 
judicial code of conduct which mirror, in varying degrees, the ABA’s 
model codes.96  Moreover, each state judiciary possesses a judicial 
investigatory mechanism which operates as an administrative 
agency.97  Most state agencies are authorized to issue advisory 
opinions as to whether a certain type of conduct may undermine 
judicial impartiality or judicial independence.98  Likewise, state 
supreme courts are empowered with rule-making authority which 
can also guide judicial behavior.99 
The first canon of the 2010 ABA Code mandates that judges “shall 
uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of 
the judiciary.”100  This canon includes three rules which instruct 
judges to comply with the law, promote confidence in the judiciary, 
and restrain from actions constituting an abuse of judicial office.101  
The code’s second canon mandates that judges have to perform their 
duties with fairness and impartiality and without bias, prejudice, or 
harassment.102  Included in this ruleset is an admonition that judicial 
duties include upholding and applying the law.103 
On a state by state basis, there are differences in the degree to 
which judges may be disciplined for engaging in conduct which 
undermines public confidence in the judiciary.  For instance, the 
Wisconsin Constitution permits the permanent removal of a judge for 
cause without legislative involvement.104  Yet, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court has made it clear that, short of a formal 
impeachment, only it, and not an executive branch agency, even with 
delegated authority from the legislature can remove a judge.105  In 
Texas, the state judicial commission may censure a judge after a 
formal proceeding, but it can only recommend removal to the state’s 
 
95 See id. at Preamble. 
96 See, e.g., CHARLES GARDNER GEYH ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.03 (5th ed. 
2013); James J. Alfini & Terrence J. Brooks, Ethical Constraints on Judicial Election 
Campaigns: A Review and Critique of Canon 7, 77 KY. L.J. 671, 673 (1989). 
97 See Alfini & Brooks, supra note 96, at 680. 
98 See GEYH ET AL., supra note 96, at § 1.13; Mel A. Topf, State Supreme Court Advisory 
Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial Review, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 101, 102 (2001). 
99 See GEYH ET AL., supra note 96, at § 6.07. 
100 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
101 See id. r. 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. 
102 Id. r. 2.2, 2.3. 
103 Id. r. 2.2. 
104 See WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 11. 
105 See Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶ 36, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 174, 897 
N.W.2d 384, 397. 
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highest court.106  Moreover, the Texas judiciary has developed a 
jurisprudence that a reprimand is assumed to have caused a judge to 
change his or her behavior, and therefore should not ordinarily serve 
as the basis for recusal, thereby giving the judge a clean slate.107  
Minnesota’s disciplinary process is structured similarly to Texas.108  
The California Commission on Judicial Performance may censure, 
admonish, or remove a judge, but the commission’s determinations 
are subject to appeal to the state supreme court.109  The Arizona 
Supreme Court is authorized to censure, suspend without pay, or 
permanently remove a judge on a recommendation from the state 
commission on judicial conduct.110  In West Virginia, a judge may only 
be permanently removed through legislative impeachment.111  The 
purpose of noting the distinctions between the state judicial 
disciplinary methods is that these distinctions will constitute one 
element to contextualize how the state supreme courts address 
allegations that judges have acted in a discriminatory manner. 
C.  Safeguards of Judicial Authority 
In spite of the possibility that judges may be suspended or removed 
from office, a judge enjoys unique safeguards not found elsewhere.112  
Judges are generally immune from civil liability for actions arising 
out of judicial service.113  For instance, a judge who enables a medical 
sterilization procedure on a person without the person’s knowledge is 
immune from civil suit.114  And, a judge who finds a defendant guilty 
or sentences a defendant based on discriminatory police actions or a 
discriminatory state law cannot be sued.115  As the Supreme Court 
 
106 See, e.g., In re Keller, 357 S.W.2d 413, 429 (Tex. 2010). 
107 See, e.g., In re Welsh, No. 09-15-00498-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 9325, at *11–12 (Tex. 
App Aug. 25, 2016) (citing In re Lewis, 495 S.W.3d 341, 345 (Tex. App. 2016)). 
108 See MINN. R. BD. ON JUD. STANDARDS r. 11. 
109 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18.  For an explanation as to what constitutes willful misconduct, 
see Dodds v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 906 P.2d 1260, 1266 (Cal. 1995).  In that decision 
the state court found that there were three elements to willful (judicial) misconduct: “1) 
‘unjudicial conduct,’ 2) ‘committed in bad faith,’ 3) ‘by a judge acting in his judicial capacity.’”  
Id. at 1266 (quoting Spruance v. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications, 532 P.2d 1209, 1221 (Cal. 
1975)). 
110 ARIZ. CONST. art. VI.I, § 4. 
111 W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8. 
112 See GEYH ET AL., supra note 96, at § 13.01. 
113 See id. 
114 See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978). 
115 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 549–50, 553–54 (1967) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 
(13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872)); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12–13 (1991) (quoting Stump, 
435 U.S. at 362 (1978) (holding a judge immune from suit for directing police to use excessive 
force in carrying out his judicial order). 
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noted in Dennis v. Sparks,116 judicial immunity against civil suits 
may extend to allegations that a judge has corruptly decided an issue, 
because there is a greater principle of having judges at “liberty to 
exercise their independent judgment about the merits of a case.”117 
A judge may, of course, be found guilty of violating the civil rights 
of a defendant if the judge knowingly acts contrary to law with the 
specific intent of depriving a citizen of his or her rights.118  However, 
this Reconstruction-era doctrine, which arose from a federal 
indictment of a state judge,119 has seldom been tested and subsequent 
courts have cast doubts on expanding the doctrine beyond the ability 
of the federal government to criminally prosecute a judge.120  At 
present, this doctrine has not been applied to judicial speech.121  
Moreover, there are other safeguards to judicial speech.  In In re 
Kendall, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that unless 
a trial judge’s statements constituted an immediate danger to the 
administration of justice, courts of appeal could not employ their 
inherent contempt authority against the offending judge.122  Kendall, 
arose from a Virgin Islands trial judge who referred to a mandamus 
order from Virgin Island Supreme Court as proof that the justices 
had committed “gross dereliction of their sworn duties and of 
committing illegal acts.”123  The Third Circuit recognized the value of 
promoting respect for the judiciary and that the trial judge had 
“gratuitously undermined” this value, but the use of contempt was 
not a proper means of discipline.124 
In spite of the probability that overt acts against specific social 
groups can contribute to a community’s implicit bias, judges have, in 
addition to other protections, a de facto safeguard against having to 
defend against their actions.125  Breaches of the codes of judicial 
conduct are not ordinarily a basis for a litigant’s claims of partiality, 
 
116 Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980). 
117 Id. at 26, 31 (citing Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554; Bradley, 80 U.S. at 349-50). 
118 See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46, 348–49 (1880). 
119  See id. at 340. 
120 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 624, 626 (2000); Francis v. Lyman, 108 
F. Supp. 884, 887, 888 (D. Mass. 1952).  But see Picking v. Pa. R.R. Co., 151 F.2d 240, 250-51 
(3d Cir. 1945) (finding that Congress in the passage of the Civil Rights Act effectively negated 
this judicial immunity for discrimination claims). 
121 See, e.g., In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814, 816 (3d Cir. 2013). 
122 See id. at 816, 826. 
123 Id. at 829. 
124 Id. at 833. 
125 See John P. Sahl, Secret Discipline in the Federal Courts-Democratic Values and Judicial 
Integrity at Stake, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 193, 229 (1994); Amy Wolf-Vanderbilt, Implicit Bias 
Shapes Our Views Without Us Knowing It, FUTURITY (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.futurity.org
/implicit-bias-1261282-2/. 
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discrimination, or favoritism.126  Instead, judicial codes of conduct are 
designed to inform judges on standards of behavior required to 
ensure that the public has confidence in the judiciary’s impartial 
administration of justice.127  Likewise, the discipline of an errant 
judge is only a determination that the judge has undermined 
confidence in the judiciary.128  For instance, a judge who 
“brandish[es]” a sexual toy at a public defender and later “refer[s] to 
this incident twice in open court so as to curtail the victim’s cross-
examination of two witnesses,” can be disciplined for devaluing the 
witness’ dignity, even though the verdict in that particular case 
remains intact.129  A judge who visits a legal brothel in Nevada and 
boasts about it in his home state, which prohibits prostitution, may 
be censured, but his past rulings in criminal trials arising from 
“public morals charges” will remain in effect.130  Likewise, a judge 
who casts an aspersion against a child victim of a sexual assault may 
be suspended without pay, but the suspension does not translate into 
a retrial.131  And a judge who sexually harasses court personnel 
outside of a courtroom may also be found to have undermined the 
integrity of the judicial branch, though his determinations in sexual 
harassment cases may be upheld.132 
To be sure, there are instances in which a judge’s poor behavior 
results in overturning a verdict, but invariably the behavior occurs 
while the judge adjudicates an issue as part of a bench trial.133  In 
1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that a judge who 
injected his personal religious beliefs into an adjudication failed to 
uphold the principle of an impartial judiciary.134  In that case, a 
father who had remarried sued his former spouse for visitation rights 
to his children.135  The former spouse testified that she did not object 
to the father’s visitation, but claimed the children refused to see their 
 
126 See, e.g., Matthews v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1250, 1255, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 
127 See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning Holien, 612 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 2000); In re Gorby, 
339 S.E.2d 702, 703 (W. Va. 1985). 
128 See In re Ross, 428 A.2d 858, 869 (Me. 1981); In re Nowell, 237 S.E.2d 246, 257 (N.C. 
1977); Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St. 3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, 
at ¶ 33 (citing Kloepfer v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 782 P.2d 239, 262 (Ca. 1989)). 
129 See, e.g., Geiler v. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications, 515 P.2d 1, 5, 9–10, 11 (Ca. 1973). 
130 See In re Tschirhart, 371 N.W.2d 850, 851, 853 (Mich. 1985). 
131 See Judicial Standards Comm’n of Mont. v. Baugh, 2014 MT 149, ¶¶ 8–11, 13, 375 Mont. 
257, 334 P.3d 352 (citing State v. Rambold, 2014 MT 116., ¶¶ 22–23, 375 Mont. 30,  325 P.3d 
686). 
132 See, In re Miera, 426 N.W.2d 850, 851, 858–59 (Minn. 1988); In re Seraphim, 294 N.W.2d 
485, 494–95, 501 (Wis. 1980). 
133 See, e.g., In re J.A., 601 A.2d 69, 72, 76–77, 79 (D.C. 1991) (per curiam). 
134 See In re Yaccarino, 502 A.2d 3, 10, 11 (N.J. 1985). 
135 Id. at 10. 
EVALUATING JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 9/17/19  5:03 PM 
1512 Albany Law Review [Vol. 82.4 
father after he remarried.136  The judge instructed the former spouse 
that even though the father was a “100 carat cad,” she had “an 
absolute affirmative duty cast upon [her] by [her] God, [not the 
judge], but by God,” to influence her children to change their 
minds.137  In this case, the judge’s ruling was overturned and 
remanded for a new hearing.138  Finally, although in theory, a bar 
association can discipline a judge since a judge is also an attorney, 
there is resistance to this because it would enable a professional 
association to usurp a formalized administrative or judicial means for 
removal.139  In 1991, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney A, determined that the 
state’s Judicial Inquiry and Review Board possessed exclusive 
constitutional jurisdiction to discipline judges.140  In 1988, eight state 
judges were removed from office after receiving gifts of money from a 
labor union.141  At the same time the administrative board sought to 
discipline the eight judges, the state board of professional 
responsibility determined that the judges violated canons of legal 
ethics, and pursued disciplinary proceedings.142  Pennsylvania’s 
supreme court recognized that the eight judges may have violated 
various canons of legal ethics, but then determined that any lawyer 
disciplinary actions would have to be abated until the Judicial 
Inquiry and Disciplinary Review Board had completed its 
investigation and any judicial avenues of redress were finalized.143  
Pennsylvania is not alone in this construct.  In In re Troisi,144 the 
West Virginia Supreme Court determined that the state’s lawyer 
disciplinary proceedings could not take action against a judge who 
assaulted a litigant party until the judge was removed from the bench 
through the state’s formal judicial discipline processes.145 
D.  Community Harm and Procedural Justice 
When the overt conduct of a judge strengthens a community’s 
 
136 See id. 
137 Id. 
138 See id. at 11. 
139 See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney A, 595 A.2d 42, 43, 49 (Pa. 
1991); Andrew E. Brashier, Comment, Ex Parte Alabama State Bar: Who Has Jurisdiction 
When Judges Act Unethically as Lawyers?, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 187, 189, 198, 201 (2009). 
140 See Anonymous Attorney A, 595 A.2d at 49. 
141 See id. at 43, 44. 
142 See id. at 43. 
143 See id. at 49. 
144 In re Troisi, 504 S.E.2d 625 (1998). 
145 See id. at 634. 
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implicit biases, the judge, either by design or accident, potentially 
creates community harm by not only shaping the unconscious 
attitudes of jury pools and witnesses, but also by undermining the 
principle of equal treatment for all litigants who may come to accept 
that judicial favoritism is an unfortunate permanent feature of the 
judicial system.146  Concerns over judicial impartiality are not new.  
In Tumey v. Ohio,147 the Supreme Court determined the Fourteenth 
Amendment guaranteed the right to an impartial judge.148  While 
Tumey established a rule prohibiting state judicial officers from 
serving on trials in which they had a pecuniary interest in the 
outcome, it also noted that there were other areas of concern, such as 
family relations between the bench and bar.149  Although the explicit 
conduct of judges falls into a different category than pecuniary 
interest, both have the possibility of eroding the public’s perception 
of the courts.150  In this respect, the notion of community harm has 
antecedent roots. 
In addition to explicit judicial conduct reinforcing a community’s 
implicit biases, another means for understanding community harm 
is to use concepts of procedural justice.  Procedural justice may be 
defined by assessing whether litigants, witnesses, or the general 
public believe that the courts are fair and judicial rulings 
legitimate.151  When the general public experiences procedural 
justice, the public perceives the judicial system as legitimate.152  
Studies on procedural justice have concluded that even in instances 
where a majority’s beliefs do not prevail in court, the overall 
impression of the judiciary does not erode if there is a widespread 
belief that the judicial body that issued its decision evidenced its 
impartiality.153  Despite judicial elections in some states, procedural 
 
146 See, e.g., James Andrew Wynn, Jr. & Eli Paul Mazur, Judicial Diversity: Where 
Independence and Accountability Meet, 67 ALB. L. REV. 775, 781, 785, 788 (2004). 
147 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
148 See id. at 523; see also Joshua E. Kastenberg, Chief Justice William Howard Taft’s 
Conception of Judicial Integrity: The Legal History of Tumey v. Ohio, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV 317, 
320–21, 366 (2016) (providing an exposition of the Court’s motivations to expand the federal 
right to the states). 
149 See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523 (citing Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266, 280 (1884)). 
150 See Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St. 3d 2004, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 
286, at ¶ 33 (citing Kloepfer v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 782 P.2d 239, 262 (Ca. 1989)); 
Kastenberg, supra note 148, at 320. 
151 See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal 
Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 128–29 (2011); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 
44 CT. REV. 26, 28 (2007). 
152 See Victor D. Quintanilla & Michael A. Yontz, Human-Centered Civil Justice Design: 
Procedural Justice and Process Value Pluralism, 54 TULSA L. REV. 114, 115 (2018). 
153 See Kristina Murphy et al., Nurturing Regulatory Compliance: Is Procedural Justice 
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justice is not a solely majoritarian province.154 
Failures in obtaining procedural justice may result in classes of 
citizens deciding not to take part in trials and other judicial functions 
such as public hearings.155  A recent study indicates that people 
believe when judges adhere to the rules governing their duties as 
embodied in the canons of judicial ethics and the plain language of 
judicial oaths, they will be more likely to participate in the judicial 
processes such as showing up for jury duty.156  When people believe 
that the courts are unfair, they will be less likely to participate in 
judicial processes, or participate, and also resort to measures such as 
jury nullification.157 
The Court recently gave the concept of procedural justice support 
in Rosales-Mireles v. United States.158  Decided on June 18, 2018, the 
Court determined that appellants erroneously convicted under the 
sentencing guidelines may raise for the first time a challenge to the 
sentence in a court of appeals, and the court of appeals must, when 
the sentencing miscalculation affects an appellant’s substantial 
rights, exercise its discretion and vacate the sentence.159  In writing 
for the majority opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor cited to the concept 
of procedural justice in noting that “regardless of its ultimate 
reasonableness, a sentence that lacks reliability because of unjust 
procedures may well undermine public perception of the 
 
Effective When People Question the Legitimacy of the Law?, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (2009); 
Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANNU. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 375, 379–80 (2006); Quintanilla & Yontz, supra note 152, at 115. 
154 See Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and 
to Legal Authorities, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 983, 992 (2000); see also STEPHEN SHUTE ET AL., 
A FAIR HEARING?: ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS 26 (2005) (“Obviously, one 
would expect those acquitted to have a more favourable view of the fairness of the outcome, 
although not necessarily the fairness of the procedures.”). 
155 See Thomas Baker et al., Shared Race/Ethnicity, Court Procedural Justice, and Self-
Regulating Beliefs: A Study of Female Offenders, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 433, 437 (2015). 
156 See Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal 
Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & 
L. 78, 81 (2014) (“When officers wield their power in fair and just ways, this imbues them with 
a sense of appropriate normative purpose and values in the eyes of citizens, in turn 
strengthening the willingness of citizens to cooperate with legal authorities.”). 
157 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1254 (2011); 
Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV 389, 398 (2004). 
158 Rosales-Mireles v. United States 138 S. Ct 1897, 1903 (2018).  The appeal in this case 
challenged the permissive nature of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).  See id. at 1903.  
This rule states, “A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though 
it was not brought to the court’s attention.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 
159 See Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct at 1903.  The petitioner in this case argued that although 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) was written as a permissive rule, the application of 
the rule by the courts of appeal should be mandatory when a defendant’s substantial rights in 
sentencing were negatively affected, even when the appellant did not raise an objection to the 
district court.  See id. at 1903, 1905. 
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proceedings.”160 
In addition to the Court, a limited number of appellate courts have 
recognized the validity of procedural justice.  In 2015, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia in United States v. Bigly161 
determined that the district courts were obligated to consider non-
frivolous mitigation evidence even if disfavored by the federal 
sentencing guidelines.162  Judge Janice Rodgers Brown in a 
concurrence determined that procedural justice is attained when a 
court responds to a defendant’s arguments.163  This is because, in 
doing so, the court “communicates a message of respect for 
defendants, strengthening what social psychologists call ‘procedural 
justice effects,’ thereby advancing fundamental purposes of the 
Sentencing Reform Act.”164  In 2014, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
upheld a state ethics rule which found that where the prosecution 
insisted on a defendant waiving the right to raise appeals based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in order to obtain a plea 
agreement, the prosecution’s demand undermined the concept of 
procedural justice.165  The Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision not 
only highlights the importance of procedural justice in criminal 
trials, but it also connected a rule of ethics as being important to 
establishing procedural justice.166 
Courts have also accepted the existence of a desired procedural 
justice goal in civil matters.  In Caban v. Jr. Seafood,167 the United 
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico concluded, as a 
matter of procedural justice, that federal courts should be reticent to 
intrude into state (or in this case commonwealth) trials unless 
absolutely necessary, because the federal courts risk the population’s 
confidence in local trials.168  In 2016, Justice Michael B. Hyman on 
 
160 Id. at 1910.  It should be noted that the dissent in this opinion, as written by Justice 
Thomas, with Justice Alito joining, cast significant doubts on the application of procedural 
justice to federal criminal courts.  See id. at 1914–15 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
161 United States v. Bigly, 786 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
162 Id. at 15 (citing In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
163 Bigley, 786 F.3d at 17 (Brown, J., concurring). 
164 Id. 
165 See United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136, 140, 157–58 (Ky. 2014).  In this 
decision, the United States Attorney challenged a state ethics rule claiming that the state rule 
usurped federal criminal practice.  See id. at 141–42.  However, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
determined that it had a duty to regulate the legal profession within the state’s borders.  See 
id. at 157–58.  In 2015, in Sanders v. State, 773 S.E.2d 580 (2015), the South Carolina Supreme 
Court adopted the reasoning underlying Kentucky Bar Association.  See Sanders, 773 S.E.2d at 
582 n.2. 
166 See Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d at 157. 
167 Caban v. Jr. Seafood, 132 F. Supp. 3d 274 (D.P.R. 2015). 
168 See id. at 284 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm’n, 40 F.3d 
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the Illinois Appellate Court noted that procedural justice and 
fairness are not limited to outcomes of civil trials, but rather should 
be assessed by a judge’s courtroom management and the effectiveness 
of attorneys.169  The Illinois Appellate Court reviewed a pro-se 
appellant’s assertion that she was not well represented in her 
personal injury lawsuit against the Chicago Transit Authority, and 
the Transit Authority’s attorney openly disobeyed the judge’s orders 
without being admonished by the judge.170  Justice Hyman cautioned 
the court of appeals that it was critical, as a matter of public 
confidence in the judiciary, to explain to a pro se litigant why the 
appellate court determined she did not state a basis for appeal in her 
brief rather than dismiss the appeal outright.171 
There are limits to courts accepting a role for procedural justice in 
judicial determinations.  In United States v. Colon,172 Judge Jeffrey 
Meyer on the United States District Court for the District of 
Connecticut accepted that government agents had engaged in 
“manipulative, sneaky, and deceitful investigative methods,” but had 
not violated the defendants’ due process rights.173  In Colon, 
government agents had created the means for the defendants’ 
attempted commission of an armed robbery.174  The defendants 
conceded that the government’s conduct did not constitute 
entrapment, but was nonetheless unconstitutionally outrageous, and 
in the alternative, the government had undermined the concept of 
procedural justice.175  Judge Meyer accepted the existence of 
procedural justice as a means for assessing the efficacy of criminal 
justice in the United States but noted that neither the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit nor the Supreme Court had found 
procedural justice as a basis for quashing indictments, suppressing 
evidence, or overturning convictions.176 
Although the Supreme Court has only recently accepted the 
importance of procedural justice,177 and although only the Kentucky 
Supreme Court has considered procedural justice as a means to 
 
18, 24 (1st Cir. 1994)). 
169 See Wing v. Chi. Transit Auth., 2016 IL (1st) 153517, ¶ 22 (Hyman, J., concurring). 
170 See id. at ¶¶ 20, 22. 
171 See id. at ¶ 24. 
172 United States v. Colon, 71 F. Supp. 3d 269 (D. Conn. 2014). 
173 Id. at 275. 
174 See id. at 273. 
175 See id. at 271, 282. 
176 See id. at 282. 
177 See Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1910 (2018). 
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gauge attorney ethics,178 there is a logical nexus between society’s 
view in the integrity of an impartial judiciary which treats all classes 
of citizens with equal respect, and society’s willingness to take part 
in its jurisdiction’s judicial functions in a fair and open-minded 
manner.179 
II.  HISTORIC MODELS OF POPULISM AND THE RULES OF JUDICIAL 
ETHICS: THE PAST IS NOT PROLOGUE 
The United States possesses a history of political and social 
movements which coalesced around beliefs that undemocratic or 
external forces threatened to extinguish “free will.”  One only need 
look at the Anti-Masonic Party of the early nineteenth century, the 
American (or Know-Nothing) Party of the mid-nineteenth century, or 
the so-called “Dixiecrats,” in the late 1940s, to find evidence that anti-
establishment and anti-government sentiment has existed in a 
continuum in the United States.180  Although these “third-parties” 
generally disappeared after one or two election cycles, their 
underlying ideologies were often subsumed into the nation’s 
majoritarian parties.181  Moreover, the judiciary was not immune 
from populist movements.182  In 1854, Supreme Court Justice John 
McLean went so far as to encourage nativists–that is, the Know 
Nothings–to field anti-government candidates in state and national 
elections.183 
 
178 See United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136, 157 (Ky. 2014). 
179 See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 151, at 132, 149; Sward, supra note 157, at 398. 
180 See, e.g., GLENN FELDMAN, THE GREAT MELDING: WAR, THE DIXIECRAT REBELLION, AND 
THE SOUTHERN MODEL FOR AMERICA’S NEW CONSERVATISM 83–84, 98–99, 204 (2015); WILLIAM 
PRESTON VAUGHAN, THE ANTIMASONIC PARTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1826-1843 99 (1983); 
Lorraine Boissoneault, How the 19th-Century Know Nothing Party Reshaped American Politics: 
From Xenophobia to Conspiracy Theories, the Know Nothing Party Launched a Nativist 
Movement Whose Effects are Still Felt Today, SMITHSONIAN (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www
.smithsonianmag.com/history/immigrants-conspiracies-and-secret-society-launched-american-
nativism-180961915/. 
181 See, e.g., DONALD J. GREEN, THIRD-PARTY MATTERS: POLITICS, PRESIDENTS, AND THIRD 
PARTIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 2 (2010); STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL., THIRD PARTIES IN 
AMERICA: CITIZEN RESPONSE TO MAJOR PARTY FAILURE 8, 10 (2d. ed. 1984). 
182 See, e.g., MICHAEL HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY: 
JACKSONIAN POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 913–14 (1999); Thomas E. Carney, 
The Political Judge: Justice John McClean’s Pursuit of the Presidency, 111 OHIO HIST. 121, 127 
(2002). 
183 See HOLT, supra note 182, at 913–14 (“McLean had flirted with the Antimasonic 
nomination in 1832, bid for the Whig nomination in 1836, and orchestrated a concerted effort 
for the party’s 1848 laurels by presenting himself as a No Party reformer.”); Carney, supra note 
182, at 127 (“McLean became a perennial candidate, with his name being mentioned at more 
than five different nominating conventions; on at least two occasions he withdrew his name 
from consideration.”). 
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In 1892, the Populist Party’s presidential candidate, James Baird 
Weaver wrote, “[I]t is not alone essential that our courts shall be pure 
in fact.  The people must have an abiding faith in their integrity.  
Society becomes insecure in proportion as popular confidence is 
shaken in this respect.”184  Weaver went on to accuse the federal 
judiciary of being in league with railroads, bankers, and investors 
and alleged a judicial lineage to the pro-slavery justices who served 
in the decades prior to the Civil War.185  Although Weaver’s 
statements may have been considered revolutionary, his negative 
assessment on the judiciary is not novel to United States history.186 
 Third-party leaders sometimes expressed a belief that the federal 
judicial system was designed to prevent the success of an ideology 
that challenged the supremacy of prevailing norms.187  In 1905, 
Eugene Debs (a labor leader who later ran for president as a Socialist 
Party candidate) claimed in a speech titled “Growth of the Injunction” 
that the Judicial Branch had departed from its duty of impartiality 
and aligned itself with corporations and banks to the detriment of 
labor.188  Debs went so far as to call William Howard Taft, a former 
judge on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and future 
president, a man with “unswerving loyalty to capital and 
unmitigated contempt for labor.”189  Debs was hardly a political 
outlier.  He garnered six percent of the popular vote in a four-way 
race against Taft, Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson in 
1912.190  Deb’s Socialist Party platform included the abolition of the 
 
184 JAMES B. WEAVER, A CALL TO ACTION 67 (1892).  Through this work, Weaver insisted 
that corporate interests such as privately owned railroads were a threat to freedom, and that 
these interests were powerful enough to capture the judicial branch.  See id. at 82, 101.  He 
noted that whoever became president after 1892 would likely have three nominees to the Court 
and he drew an analogy to the Court on the eve of the Civil War in which the “slave interests” 
had made it impossible for morality to triumph.  Id. at 93.  Weaver saw corporate interests as 
an equal threat to democracy as slavery had been, and he warned that both Harrison and 
Cleveland would nominate justices who sided with corporations, just as earlier presidents had 
appointed pro-slavery men to the bench.  See id. at 80–83. 
185 See id. at 80–81, 86, 101. 
186 See WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS 
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937 1 (1994); Alan Furman Westin, The Supreme Court, the 
Populist Movement and the Campaign of 1896, 15 J. POL. 3, 20–21 (1953). 
187 See Adam Burton, Pay No Attention to the Men Behind the Curtain: The Supreme Court, 
Popular Culture, and the Countermajoritarian Problem, 73 UMKC L. REV. 53, 56 (2004); John 
B. Judis, Us v. Them: The Birth of Populism, GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www
.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/13/birth-of-populism-donald-trump. 
188 See EUGENE V. DEBS, Growth of the Injunction, in WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EUGENE 
V. DEBS 167, 169 (1948) [hereinafter DEBS, Growth of the Injunction]. 
189 See Id. 
190 See Eugene V. Debs, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/us-politics/eugene-v-debs (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2019); see also ERNEST FREEBERG, DEMOCRACY’S PRISONER: EUGENE V. DEBS, 
THE GREAT WAR, AND THE RIGHT TO DISSENT 19–20 (2008) (discussing Woodrow Wilson and 
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federal injunction as well as diminishing the Judicial Branch’s 
jurisdiction to matters involving disputes between the states.191  The 
goal of removing the Supreme Court from state judicial decisions 
would later be adopted by mid-twentieth century southern 
democrats, albeit for a vastly different reason.192 
The nation’s first economic downturn, known as the Panic of 1819, 
resulted in the first consequential popular attack on an established 
state court.193  Kentucky, the fifteenth state admitted to the Union, 
saw its state legislature and judiciary engage in a jurisdictional fight 
in which the constitutionally established judiciary was voted out of 
existence.194  The basis for the legislature’s action had to do with a 
popular belief that the banks, particularly the Bank of the United 
States, had limited monies during the financial crisis and the 
judiciary favored creditors at the expense of beleaguered farmers.195  
In 1820, the state’s voting population overwhelmingly elected the 
Debt Relief Party—a state-level party—to a majority in both of the 
state’s legislative houses.196 
Kentucky’s legislature abolished debtors’ prisons and extended the 
time that farmers had to pay off their debts.197  The Kentucky Court 
of Appeals struck down several of the new laws and, in turn, the 
legislature established a new court of appeals in 1824.198  But, the 
original appellate court refused to disband and a standoff between 
the “Old Court” on the one side, and the legislature and “New Court” 
on the other.199  During the two-year period, the “New Court” and the 
 
Theodore Roosevelt’s approach to silencing Debs during the 1912 election). 
191 See DEBS, Growth of the Injunction, at 171; FREEBERG, supra note 190, at 85. 
192 See KARL FREDERICKSON, THE DIXIECRAT REVOLT AND THE END OF THE SOLID SOUTH, 
1932-1968 218 (2001); Naomi Murakawa, The Racial Antecedents to Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: How Congress Judged the Judges from Brown to Booker, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 473, 487 (2006). 
193 See Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and 
Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 302, 308–09 (2010). 
194 See JAMES RAMAGE & ANDREA S. WATKINS, KENTUCKY RISING: DEMOCRACY, SLAVERY, 
AND CULTURE FROM THE EARLY REPUBLIC TO THE CIVIL WAR 3 (2011); Admission of States to 
Union, U.S. HIST., https://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h928.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
195 See David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 51–
52 (2015); John Yoo, Judicial Supremacy Has Its Limits, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (2015); 
see also SEAN WILIENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 288 
(2005) (discussing the measures taken by the Relief-Party in an effort to enact several pro-
debtor measures including laws extending the time granted to repay creditors). 
196 See WILIENTZ, supra note 195, at 288. 
197 See id. 
198 See RAMAGE & WATKINS, supra note 194, at 87. 
199 See id.; see also ROBERT V. REMINI, HENRY CLAY: STATESMAN FOR THE UNION 199 (1991) 
(“The struggles between the New Court and the Old Court, which carried forward the quarrel 
between the Relief and the Anti-Relief parties, shaped Kentucky Politics throughout the decade 
of the 1820s and beyond.”). 
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“Old Court,” invalidated each other’s rulings and issued contempt 
rulings against their political opponents.200  When, in 1826, the 
economic downturn had been reversed, a new legislature invalidated 
the new court of appeals.201 
A.  Nineteenth Century Populism: An Absence of Continuity with the 
Present 
Defining late nineteenth century populism requires an 
understanding that there is a scholarly debate as to whether the 
populists transitioned into the progressive wings of the Republican 
and Democratic Parties.202  While legal history may perhaps be 
considered a distracting diversion, it is important in explaining why 
any use of the past century’s populist history as a model to assess the 
present would be in error.  This is because much of the writing on the 
origins, goals, and impact of populism has altered over time.203  In 
the mid-twentieth century, mainstream historians accepted an 
interpretation by Frederick Jackson Turner that the populist 
movement was a democratic revolt in the western states against 
eastern business interests.204  Turner hypothesized that the pioneers 
who settled in the western frontier had developed an individuality 
that resulted in an American ethos or character, which challenged 
settled institutions.205  Turner viewed populists as people who 
protected democracy by demanding that the government control 
forces such as railroads and eastern-based wealth that threatened 
democracy’s well-being.206  By characterizing wealthy easterners as 
modern-day aristocrats, Turner was able to distinguish late 
nineteenth century populism with socialism or other “foreign” 
 
200 See, e.g., John C. Doolan, The Old Court- New Court Controversy, 11 GREEN BAG 177, 183 
(1899). 
201 See RAMAGE & WATKINS, supra note 194, at 87. 
202 See Stuart Chinn, Political Parties and Constitutional Fidelity, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 388, 
436–37 (2018); Cliff Schecter, Extremely Motivated: The Republican Party’s March to the Right, 
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1663, 1665–66, 1667 (2002); see also CHESTER MCARTHUR DESTLER, 
AMERICAN RADICALISM, 1861-1901: ESSAYS AND DOCUMENTS 15 (1946) (describing the 
emergence of populism). 
203 See Mark A. Graber, Thick and Thin: Interdisciplinary Conversations on Populism, Law 
Political Science and Constitutional Change, 90 GEO. L.J. 233, 238–39 (2001). 
204 See CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST VISION 6 (2007). 
205 See id. at 26; see also DAVID W. NOBLE, HISTORIANS AGAINST HISTORY: THE FRONTIER 
THESIS AND THE NATIONAL COVENANT IN AMERICAN HISTORICAL WRITING SINCE 1830 51 (1965) 
(“In the arid West these pioneers . . . see the sharp contrast between their traditional idea of 
America, as the land of opportunity, the land of self-made man, free from class distinctions and 
from the power of wealth, and the existing America, so unlike the earlier ideal.”). 
206 See NOBEL, supra note 205, at 51. 
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ideologies.207  As a result, the modern understanding of nineteenth 
century populism is that it was both inherently “American,” 
compatible with democracy, and many of its sub-ideologies became 
component parts of the modern party system.208 
Richard Hofstadter, like Turner, recognized that populism had 
rural origins, but he also noted that by 1880, the demographics of the 
United States had transitioned from a largely Yankee-Protestant 
majority with an attendant morality centered on the concept of hard 
work, to a diversified population caused by Eastern and Central 
European immigration.209  Unlike Turner, Hofstadter noted that 
nineteenth century populism was inherently anti-immigrant, and 
labor leaders and skilled craftsmen viewed immigration as a threat 
to their economic status.210  More recently, Professor Gretchen Ritter 
has argued that, while populism differed by region, the most common 
theme was in its anti-monopolistic focus.211  Professor Ritter’s theory 
explains the brief alliance between diverse economic groups.212  
Midwestern farmers demanded the government own or regulate 
banks and railroads, while the labor leaders in the cities vehemently 
opposed low-wages associated with immigration.213  Professor Ritter’s 
work also takes note of an important facet of American history that 
Turner ignored.  The decade following 1880 was a period of economic 
uncertainty, characterized by labor strikes which approached 10,000 
in total.214 
In addition to Ritter’s view of populist movements as being anti-
monopolistic, it is important to note that the populist’s presidential 
candidate James Baird Weaver, who had attacked the judiciary, was 
not a political outsider.  A Union general and Civil War veteran who 
fought under General William Sherman, Weaver served three terms 
in Congress as a member of the Greenback Party.215  When that party 
 
207 See id. 
208 See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 
87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066–67 (2001); Thompson Chengeta, When at Loggerheads with 
Customary International Law: The Right to Run for Public Office and the Right to Vote, 43 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 399, 414 (2018). 
209 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 8 (1955). 
210 See id. at 178. 
211 See GRETCHEN RITTER, GOLDBUGS AND GREENBACKS: THE ANTIMONOPOLY TRADITION 
AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE IN AMERICA 255 (1997). 
212 See id. at 256. 
213 See id. 
214 See FLORENCE PETERSON, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, STRIKES IN THE UNITED STATES 
1880-1936 21 (1937). 
215 See Weaver, James Baird, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONG., http://bioguide
.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=W000225 (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
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collapsed, he joined with the Populists.216  While Weaver has largely 
been relegated to a historic footnote, it is noteworthy that he received 
over eight percent of the popular vote and won all of the Electoral 
College votes in Colorado, Nevada and Idaho.217  He also won one of 
Oregon’s and North Dakota’s four electoral votes.218  Most 
importantly, Weaver was hardly a political outsider. 
B.  Modern United States Populism 
If nineteenth century populism adopted a conviction that the 
majority’s identity and their ability to economically succeed had been 
diminished by foreign elements, modern right-wing populism adds to 
this character a notional belief that there exists a liberal assault on 
religion, and an imposed institutional “political correctness” that 
neuters fundamental tenets of national existence.219  Moreover, a 
current focus of modern populists include doubts as to whether 
Hispanic and Muslim citizens can be considered “American.”220  
President Trump’s earlier assertion that President Barak Obama 
was not a native-born citizen221 was by no means relegated to 
campaign hyperbole.  In 1993, noted economist Paul Krugman, who 
later was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, 
warned that domestic opposition to the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) was a form of modern populism.222  Krugman 
argued that the agreement’s opponents had advanced an overly 
 
216 See JAMES L. HUSTON, SECURING THE FRUITS OF LABOR: THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF 
WEALTH DISTRIBUTION 1765–1900 355 (1996); Westin, supra note 186, at 3. 
217 See RALPH YOUNG, DISSENT: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEA 253 (2015). 
218 See id. 
219 See, e.g., David Nakamura, Celebrating Merry Christmas Again: Trump Opens New Front 
in the Culture Wars, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/celeb 
rating-merry-christmas-again-trump-opens-new-front-in-the-culture-
wars/2017/11/30/e28a40e0-d5ee-11e7-a986-
d0a9770d9a3e_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.401d89ad6931. 
220 See Teran Powell, ‘I Wear It Very Proudly that I’m an American’: Janan Najeeb, WUWM 
(Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.wuwm.com/post/i-wear-it-very-proudly-im-american-janan-najeeb 
#stream/0; Zac Cheney-Rice, Tom Brokaw Wants Hispanics to Assimilate. Hispanics Aren’t the 
Problem., INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 27, 2019) http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/01/tom-brokaw-
trumpets-his-ignorance-of-hispanic-assimilation.html; Fabiola Santiago, Latinos can Never 
Assimilate Enough for the Tom Brokaws of America, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/fabiola-santiago/article22519
5465.html. 
221 See Hanna Krueger et al., Trump’s Most Notable Insults, HILL (July 26, 2015), http://
thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/249102-trumps-most-notable-insults. 
222 Paul Krugman, The Uncomfortable Truth About NAFTA: It’s Foreign Policy, Stupid, 72 
FOREIGN AFF. 13, 13–14 (1993); Past Winners of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/business/economy/past-
winners-of-the-nobel-memorial-prize-in-economic-science.html. 
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simplistic and false narrative that American jobs would be lost to 
Mexico.223  Some of America’s more prominent NAFTA opponents, 
such as Patrick Buchanan, added to this narrative that NAFTA 
presented a danger to America’s identity.224  Although NAFTA is 
almost twenty-five years old, it remains a rally-point for modern 
populists.225 
According to University of Georgia political science professor, Cas 
Mudde, modern populism is a “thin ideology.”226  Unlike socialism or 
fascism, Professor Mudde posits that populism “calls for kicking out 
the political establishment, [without] specify[ing] what should 
replace it.”227  Professor Mudde points out that populism is also a 
label which is seldom claimed by the people advancing its ideology, 
and indeed the term “populism,” carries several negative 
connotations.228  University of Oregon political science Professor 
Joseph Lowndes, argues that modern United States populism has, at 
its core, an appeal to both “whiteness and masculinity.”229  As 
examples for this argument, Lowndes begins with the presidential 
campaign of George Wallace in 1968, and then uses Richard Nixon’s 
attacks on liberal elites, as well as Ronald Reagan’s campaign against 
“welfare queens.”230  The real target of these attacks, Lowndes points 
out, was not the individual recipients of welfare or the nation’s 
universities, but rather, a federal government which enabled a 
system to take resources from working “middle Americans,” and 
transfer these to others, ostensibly non-white Americans.231  Lowndes 
concludes his essay on populism with an exposition on President 
Trump’s campaign, which included veiled promises to regain a period 
in which a white majority was also the dominant political and 
economic voice.232 
Professor Pippa Norris, a Harvard University political science 
 
223 See Krugman supra note 222, at 14. 
224 See FREDERICK W. MAYER, INTERPRETING NAFTA: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS 270 (1998). 
225 See Simon Lester & Inu Manak, A Framework for Rethinking NAFTA for the 21st 
Century: Policies, Institutions, and Regionalism 2–3 (Ctr. for Trade & Econ. Integration, 
Working Paper No. 2017-10, 2017). 
226 Uri Friedman, What Is a Populist: And Is Donald Trump One?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/what-is-populist-trump/516525/. 
227 Id. 
228 See CAS MUDDE & CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER, POPULISM: A VERY SHORT 
INTRODUCTION 2 (2017). 
229 Joseph Lowndes, Populism in the United States, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM 
232, 233 (Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al. eds., 2017). 
230 Id. 
231 See id. 
232 See id. at 242. 
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professor, provides a different explanation of modern populism.233  
Populism, according to Norris, has three primary dimensions 
regardless of whether it is a “right-wing” or “left-wing” movement.234  
The first is that moral virtue and power should reside with ordinary 
people and not elites.235  Secondly, populism is an inherently anti-
establishment movement.236  Finally, it is lacking in structural 
mechanisms and there is a tendency to have power concentrated in a 
populist movement’s charismatic leader.237  It should be added that 
modern right-wing populist rhetoric is partly based on insulting 
individuals and groups that its leaders oppose.238  This rhetoric does 
have an effect on the federal and state judiciaries in that President 
Trump has approached the judiciary consistent with the prevailing 
rhetorical norms.239  Indeed, his accusation that Judge Curiel was 
incapable of exercising independent judgment because of his 
Hispanic heritage, fits neatly in both Professor Norris and Professor 
Mudde’s models of populism.240 
III.  CASE STUDIES ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Freedom of speech is a fundamental right of individuals protected 
by both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.241  Neither the 
 
233 See Thomas B. Edsall, The Peculiar Populism of Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/opinion/the-peculiar-populism-of-donald-trump
.html; Sean Illing, Why Trump’s Populist Appeal Is About Culture, Not the Economy: A Harvard 
Political Scientist on the West’s Cultural Crisis, VOX (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.vox.com
/conversations/2017/3/27/15037232/trump-populist-appeal-culture-economy. 
234 See Illing, supra note 233. 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
237 See id; see also Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of 
Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash 30 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working 
Paper No. RWP16-026, 2016) (“Populists support charismatic leaders, reflecting a deep 
mistrust of the ‘establishment’ and mainstream parties who are led nowadays by educated 
elites with progressive cultural views on moral issues.”). 
238 See Robert C. Rowland, Donald Trump and the Rejection of the Norms of American 
Politics and Rhetoric, in AN UNPRECEDENTED ELECTION: MEDIA, COMMUNICATION, AND THE 
ELECTORATE IN THE 2016 CAMPAIGN 189, 195 (Benjamin R. Warner et al. eds., 2018).  There 
have also been discussions regarding specific instances of right-wing rhetoric based on the 
insult.  See, e.g., Eliza Collins, Top 5 Insults Donald Trump Has Used on Twitter, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 21, 2016), www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/09/21/top-5-insults-
donald-trump-has-used-twitter/90797666; Krueger, et al., supra note 221; Tessa Stuart, 
Donald Trump’s Meanest Twitter Insults, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 10, 2016), 
www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/donald-trumps-favorite-twitter-insults-20160310. 
239 See Wolf, supra note 93. 
240 See id. 
241 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476, 484 (1957)); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570–71 (1942) (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938)). 
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federal government nor the state governments can prohibit speech 
that may constitute “hate speech.”242  Nonetheless, the federal and 
state judiciaries have upheld limits on the speech of government 
personnel.243  In spite of these limits, it is not settled if there is a 
universal standard of limits for judges.  For instance, in Butler v. 
State Judicial Inquiry Commission,244 the Alabama Supreme Court 
determined that judicial ethics canons prohibiting a candidate for 
judicial office from knowingly or recklessly attacking another 
candidate with false information was an overbroad restraint on free 
speech.245  Likewise, in In re Chmura,246 the Michigan Supreme Court 
found that the state’s prohibition against a judicial candidate 
disparaging an opponent with false or misleading statements was too 
overbroad an intrusion into the right of free speech.247 
Although one could analyze the impact of modern “right wing” 
populism’s impact on several classes of people, this Article 
concentrates on gender, race, and the LGBT community.  This section 
begins with an analysis of how the principle of free speech has been 
used to protect judicial conduct.  It then progresses into an analysis 
as to how various state supreme courts have assessed discrimination 
against the three groups as well as penalized judges who departed 
from expected standards of judicial conduct. 
 
 
A.  Free Speech vs. Judicial Impartiality: The (Past) California 
Model and Current “Mississippi Approach” 
Although there are several appellate court decisions encompassing 
a question of whether removal or recusal is an appropriate remedy 
for instances where judicial speech expresses discrimination against 
 
242 See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). 
243 See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 
(1973); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356 n. 13 (1980) (“[A] governmental employer may 
subject its employees to such special restrictions on free expression as are reasonably necessary 
to promote effective government.”).  But see Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 684 (1972) (citing 
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (finding that the government can 
constitutionally mandate certain speech from government employees through oaths). 
244 Butler v. State Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 802 So. 2d 207 (Ala. 2001). 
245 See id. at 218. 
246 In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000). 
247 See id. at 45. 
EVALUATING JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 9/17/19  5:03 PM 
1526 Albany Law Review [Vol. 82.4 
a group,248 a 1982 California Supreme Court decision, In re Stevens249 
may be the most helpful in providing context to the tension between 
free speech and the regulation of judicial conduct.250  In 1981, 
California’s Commission on Judicial Performance concluded that 
Judge Charles S. Stevens had, since his appointment in 1971, 
“repeatedly and persistently used racial and ethnic epithets, and 
made racially stereotypical remarks to counsel and court 
personnel.”251  Although the Los Angeles Times reported that Stevens 
claimed his comments were “made in jest,” Southern California 
nonetheless learned of his statements.252 
Most of Judge Stevens’ conduct occurred in his chambers and not 
in open court.253  The state commission concluded that there was no 
evidence that Judge Stevens had disparately treated litigants or 
witnesses on the basis of race, but his conduct was censurable.254  The 
California Supreme Court, in a two-paragraph opinion, upheld the 
commission’s recommendation of a censure against Judge Stevens on 
the basis that it was “prejudicial to the administration of justice that 
brings the judicial office into disrepute.”255  The censure, however, 
placed no limits on Judge Stevens from accepting future cases.256  
Associate Justice Otto Kaus issued a concurring opinion, which 
essentially took the majority to task for not fully articulating the 
nature of Stevens’ speech, which included racial epithets against 
African-Americans and Philippine-Americans in open court.257 
 
248 Compare In re Chevron U.S.A., 121 F.3d 163, 164 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e conclude that the 
actions complained of meet the standards for recusal . . . but, as we explain, we exercise our 
discretion and decline to issue the requested writ.”), and Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 130 
(6th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he District Judge had a duty to recuse himself in order to preserve the 
indispensable semblance of fairness.”), with  Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. 
Osborne, 2008-JP-00454-SCT (¶ 43) (Miss. 2009) (“Judge Osborne’s actions constituted willful 
misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . . We thus order 
Judge Osborne to be suspended from office for a period of one year.”). 
249 In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1982). 
250 See id. at 99. 
251 Id. 
252 Phillip Hager, Judge Faces Censure for Ethnic, Racial Remarks, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1982, 
at 7. 
253 In re Stevens, 645 P.2d at 99. 
254 See id. 
255 Id. 
256 See CAL. CONST. art. VI § 18; In re Stevens, 645 P.2d at 99. 
257 In re Stevens, 645 P.2d at 99 (Kaus, J., concurring).  While the majority only issued a 
brief decision upholding the censure, Associate Justice Otto Kaus concurred where he listed 
what he believed to be the most egregious examples of Stevens’ conduct.  Justice Kaus noted, 
 
During an in-chambers discussion regarding a criminal case involving two black 
defendants and a white victim, Judge Stevens remarked to counsel that black persons 
have to learn how to live in their own neighborhoods and that it was “typical” of black 
EVALUATING JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 9/17/19  5:03 PM 
2018/2019] Evaluating Judicial Standards of Conduct 1527 
Associate Justice Stanley Mosk, in his dissent, conceded that he 
was appalled with Stevens’ conduct, but he accused the majority of 
not adequately protecting free speech.258  Justice Mosk drew a 
distinction between on-bench conduct and extrajudicial conduct, and 
then argued that the majority punished Stevens for an arena of 
behavior that it could not intrude into.259  In doing so, he drew on the 
civil rights battles of the previous two decades where “many a red-
neck sheriff interpreted civil rights speeches—particularly in and 
around court houses—as impermissible conduct.”260  In essence, 
Justice Mosk, who had been regarded as a liberal pro-civil rights 
justice, argued that a greater good required permitting a judge to 
have the same free speech protections as the citizenry.261  His purpose 
for making this argument was not simply a fear of an administrative 
agency being permitted to curtail free speech rights.262  It was also 
because he viewed that limits on extrajudicial speech would 
undermine the independence of the state judiciary and force judges 
to hide their prejudices.263 
Judge Mosk’s freedom of judicial speech jurisprudence survives 
into the present, but the state courts of appeal who favor its 
 
persons to fight unfairly. 
 Judge Stevens, during his term in office, referred to black persons as “Jig, dark boy, 
colored boy, nigger, coon, Amos and Andy, and jungle bunny.”  With one exception, Judge 
Stevens did not use these terms in open court or with reference to a party, witness or 
attorney in a case before him.  In 1974, in a probate case involving a controversy between 
black litigants regarding burial of a loved one, Judge Stevens stated in the presence of 
court personnel only, “let’s get on with this Amos and Andy show.”  On another occasion, 
he privately referred to his court clerk as being “lazier than a coon.” 
 During another in-chambers discussion, Judge Stevens stated to a public defender that 
“Filipinos can be good, hard-working people and that they are clean, unlike some black 
animals who come into contact with the court.” 
 
Id. at 99–100 (Kaus, J., concurring). 
258 See id. at 101 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
259 See id. 
260 Id. 
261 See id. (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 674 (1944)); Stanley Mosk, 
CAL. SUPREME CT. HIST. SOC’Y, https://www.cschs.org/history/california-supreme-court-justices
/stanley-mosk/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
262 See In re Stevens, 645 P.2d at 100–01 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
263 See id. at 101.  Justice Mosk concluded, 
 
If the day comes—and in view of the majority opinion it may be here—when judges at any 
level are to be disciplined for their manner of expression, however primitive, then we no 
longer have an independent judiciary in California.  Judges will inevitably become timid 
and stifled, even though the Constitutions of the United States and of California apply to 
all persons; nothing in their text suggests that judges are excluded from protection. 
 
Id. 
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continuance tend to protect judges who demean minority groups.264  
Moreover, there are instances in which judicial discipline is 
imbalanced.  In 2009, the Mississippi Supreme Court, in Mississippi 
Commission on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, upheld the 
suspension of a judge who articulated racially disparaging language 
and warned the state judiciary that “[n]o one is compelled to serve as 
a judge, but once an individual offers himself or herself for service, 
that individual accepts the calling with full knowledge of certain 
limitations upon speech and actions in order to serve the greater 
good.”265  During a reelection campaign, Judge Solomon Osborne was 
quoted as saying to a predominately African-American audience: 
“White folks don’t praise you unless you’re a damn fool.  Unless they 
think they can use you.  If you have your own mind and know what 
you’re doing, they don’t want you around.”266 
The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance—the state’s 
statutorily created administrative agency charged with investigating 
complaints against judges—recommended a lifetime suspension from 
judicial service against Judge Osborne.267  Although the state 
supreme court found that Judge Osborne had “a long history of 
violating the judicial canons” of ethics, and had already resigned, it 
determined that a one year suspension was a more appropriate 
remedy.268  One year before the state supreme court upheld the 
suspension sanction against Judge Osborne, it upheld a public 
reprimand for Judge Nikki Boland after she stated, “African-
Americans in Hinds County can go to hell for all I care.”269  There 
were factual differences between the conduct of the two judges.  
Judge Osborne was in the process of campaigning for reelection and 
advanced a defense that his statements—after first denying making 
 
264 Compare CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, ET AL., 1 JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS, § 10.06(3) 
(5th ed. 2018) (“Statements of opinion on public issues may be controversial or offensive to 
certain groups while still falling in the ambit of protected discourse, particularly where the 
statements are ambiguous or context-dependent.”), with id. at § 3.03 (“[A]t the very least, it is 
both undignified and discourteous for a judge to make a racially derogatory statement from the 
bench, and therefore violative of Canon 3(B)(4) of the 1990 Code, it may also be indicative of 
bias.”). 
265 Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, 2008-JP-00454-SCT (¶ 22) (Miss. 
2009).  The state supreme court is composed of nine elected justices who serve for eight-year 
terms.  See MISS. CONST. art. VI, §§ 145B, 149. 
266 Osborne, 2008-JP-00454-SCT at (¶ 60) (Dickinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
267 See id. at (¶ 7) (majority opinion).  The Commission is established under Mississippi law.  
See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 9-19-1–9-19-31 (1972). 
268 Osborne, 2008-JP-00454-SCT at ¶¶ 35, 43. 
269 Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Boland, 2007-JP-00661-SCT (¶ 9) (Miss. 2008) 
(en banc). 
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them—constituted protected speech.270  Judge Boland conveyed her 
statements at a judicial conference in Dallas, Texas and then left 
from office.271 
It is problematic that, while both judges articulated racially 
derogatory comments, the Caucasian judge received a reprimand 
rather than a suspension, and a harsher punishment was levied 
against the African-American judge.272  Put another way, the state 
supreme court’s decision regarding Judge Boland arguably contains 
an subliminal message that defaming the state’s majority population 
carries a greater possibility of removal, then does provoking speech 
against minority populations.  If one considers Mississippi’s 
demographics, a state with almost three million residents, in light of 
the  goal of a colorblind judiciary, the uneven discipline of Boland and 
Olson could be interpreted as the state judiciary informing both its 
majority Caucasian (59.2%) population, and minority African-
American (37.8%) population that judges who have exhibited a 
devaluing of people on the basis of their minority race or national 
origin, may one day return to the judiciary at a faster rate than those 
who devalue Mississippi’s majority population.273 
Wholly absent from either Osborne or Boland is a recognition of 
how judicial actions of an explicit nature can constitute community 
harm by strengthening implicit biases.  According to the American 
Public Media Reports, Mississippi’s prosecutors strike African-
American jurors through the peremptory strike process in criminal 
trials at four times the rate that Caucasian jurors are removed.274  
Beyond the continued disparate treatment of jurors based on race, 
there may be an underlying judicial attitude which conveys to the 
legal community a wider acceptability of discrimination against 
 
270 See Osborne, 2008-JP-00454-SCT at ¶¶3, 5. 
271 Boland, 2007-JP-00661-SCT at ¶ 3.  Judge Boland, advanced as her defense that she was 
ill at the time she made her comments and also that her speech was protected under the First 
Amendment.  See id. at ¶¶ 16, 34. 
272 Compare Boland, 2007-JP-00661-SCT at ¶ 68 (finding a public reprimand to be 
appropriate), with Osborne, 2008-JP-00454-SCT at ¶ 43 (issuing a one-year suspension). 
273 See Quick Facts: Mississippi, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts
/fact/table/ms/PST045218 (last visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
274 See Will Craft, Mississippi D.A. Has Long History of Striking Many Blacks from Juries, 
AM. PUB. MEDIA (June 12, 2018), https://features.apmreports.org/in-the-dark/mississippi-
district-attorney-striking-blacks-from-juries/; Jerry Mitchell, Report: Mississippi DA Struck 
Black Jurors at 4½ Times Greater Rate, CLARION LEDGER (June 12, 2018), 
https://www.clarionledge r.com/story/news/2018/06/12/does-da-curtis-flowers-case-seek-strike-
black-potential-jurors/692156002/; Study: Local Mississippi Prosecutors Struck Black Jurors at 
More than Four Times the Rate of Whites, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/7123 (last visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
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minority populations.275  Notably, some of the state’s justices have 
attacked one of the fundamental cornerstones of ensuring equal 
treatment under the law.  In Czekala-Chathamfiled, v. State ex rel. 
Hood,276 the state supreme court issued an order to the state’s lower 
courts to accept subject matter jurisdiction over same-sex marriages 
and divorces.277  In essence, a majority of the state’s justices 
mandated that Obergefell v. Hodges,278 the United States Supreme 
Court’s opinion finding that same-sex couples possessed a right under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and Equal 
Protection Clause to marry, and, commensurately divorce, was the 
law of Mississippi.279 
Prior to Obergfell, Mississippi’s voters and legislators had opposed 
same-sex marriage, by placing into the state constitution a ban 
specific to same-sex marriages.280  In Czekala, two of the state’s 
justices dissented from the order implementing Obergfell on the basis 
that the United States Supreme Court had exceeded its authority.281 
Associate Justice Josiah Coleman emphatically asserted that his 
state constitutional oath of office barred him from enforcing 
Obergfell.282  After accusing five United States Supreme Court 
justices of usurping a state’s sovereign authority, he took the 
opportunity to place some of the blame on the Supreme Court under 
Chief Justice Earl Warren for creating the basis to enable such a 
usurpation in the issuance of its early civil rights opinions.283  In 
doing so, he asserted that inferior court judges do not owe fealty to 
the Supreme Court, but then argued that since Brown v. Board of 
 
275 See Boland, 2007-JP-00661-SCT at ¶ 68; Osborne, 2008-JP-00454-SCT at ¶ 43; In re 
Agresta, 476 N.E.2d 285, 286 (N.Y. 1985) (per curiam); J. Thomas Sullivan, Discrimination in 
The Administration of Criminal Justice: Lethal Discrimination, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC 
JUST. 69, 110 (2010). 
276 Caekala-Chathamfiled v. State ex rel. Hood, 2014-CA-00008-SCT (Miss. 2015). 
277 See id. at 187.  The Mississippi Supreme Court is composed of nine judges.  See MISS. 
CONST. art. VI, § 145-B. 
278  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
279 See Caekala-Chatamfield, 2014-CA-00008-SCT at ¶¶ 4, 6. 
280 MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263-A.  While this article took effect in 2004 after a popular vote, 
it should be pointed out that this article replaced an article repealed in 1987 banning interracial 
marriage.  See MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263 (repealed 1987).  The Supreme Court had struck 
down such bans in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  Hence one could posit that 
Mississippi’s legislature and voters resisted immediate implementation of a removal of a prior 
restriction on marriage. 
281 See Caekala-Chatamfield, 2014-CA-00008-SCT at ¶ 6 (Dickinson, J., dissenting); id. at 
¶¶ 3–4 (Coleman, J., dissenting). 
282 See id. at ¶ 7 (Coleman, J., dissenting) (“No inferior judge, to my knowledge, has ever 
taken an oath of fealty to the United States Supreme Court, but here we take an oath of office 
prescribed by the Constitution of Mississippi.”). 
283 See id. at ¶¶ 9–10, 15. 
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Education, and, in particular Cooper v. Aaron, the Court has 
undertaken an error-based attitude that the Constitution is what a 
majority of the Court determines it to be.284  Presiding Justice Jess 
Hays Dickinson likewise argued in his dissent that Obergfell 
undermined Mississippi’s judicial oath of office so as to create a 
justiciable issue.285  Both justices, to be sure, were sincere in their 
belief that the four United States Supreme Court justices who 
dissented in Obergfell correctly accused the majority of 
unconstitutionally legislating a new right and in the process 
overturning the rights of the state’s voters.286  Yet, the Czekala 
dissent may have empowered the state’s lesser judges to articulate 
criticisms of equal treatment norms.  Having recognized this 
possibility, it must be stressed that the justices were wholly within 
their judicial authority to dissent and it would undermine judicial 
independence to place limits against this type of dissent.287  Yet, the 
tenor of their argument could serve as an unintended basis for trial 
judges to engage in conduct which stigmatizes minorities and, in 
turn, strengthens the community’s implicit biases. 
B.  LGBT and Equal Rights: The Marriage Cases 
In 2016, the Oregon Commission on Judicial Fitness unanimously 
recommended removing Judge Vance Day from his position.288  The 
state’s administrative commission determined that Judge Day had, 
among other deficiencies, violated a state judicial code by 
“prohibiting manifestation of bias or prejudice in the performance of 
judicial duties.”289  The commission also determined that Day 
undermined confidence in the judiciary through willful 
 
284 See id. at ¶ 10. 
285 See id. at ¶¶ 6, 15 (Dickinson, J., dissenting). 
286 See id. at ¶ 6 (“The Obergefell dissenters have raised a question which—as Justice 
Coleman explains—implicates our oath of office as justices of this Court: Did the Obergefell 
majority engage in legislative enactment, rather judicial interpretation, exceeding the power 
conferred upon it by the United States Constitution?”); id. at ¶¶ 14–15 (Coleman, J., 
dissenting). 
287 See id. at ¶ 18 (Dickinson, J., dissenting). 
288 Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Day), 413 P.3d 907, 912 (Or. 2018).  Day first came to the 
commission’s attention, in 2012, when he chastised a youth soccer referee over the referee’s 
performance at his son’s game.  See id. at 914–15.  According to the referee, Day handed the 
referee his business card indicting that he was a trial judge, and this served to intimidate the 
referee.  Id. at 914.  The commission determined, at first, not to fully investigate this incident 
after determining that the complaints against Day were misplaced.  Id. at 915. 
289 Id. at 912.  Oregon Code of Judicial Ethics, Rule 3.3(B) prohibits a judge from the 
manifestation of bias or prejudice in the performance of judicial duties.  See OR. MODEL CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 3.3 (2013). 
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misconduct.290  On March 15, 2018, the Oregon Supreme Court, in a 
per curiam opinion, upheld six of the eight misconduct charges that 
the commission had found Judge Day guilty of.291  Judge Day had 
strong beliefs regarding the Second Amendment to the point where 
he permitted a former Navy SEAL convicted of DUI to handle 
firearms and refused to perform same-sex marriages after 
Obergfell.292  Day employed a “screening process” to avoid his office 
being used for same-sex marriages.293 
In regard to Judge Day’s refusal to perform same-sex marriages, 
the state supreme court concluded that “solemnizing marriages,” 
while discretionary for judges, is a judicial act and therefore, a judge 
cannot “screen” marriage applicants to refuse same-sex couples the 
same treatment accorded opposite sex couples.294  The Oregon 
Supreme Court reminded trial judges that the state’s judicial rule 
prohibiting a judge from manifesting bias is measured by whether a 
member of the public would find a judicial act an obvious indicia of 
judicial bias.295  The Court went on to note that racial slurs and 
epithets, as well as other actions to demean a class of persons based 
on race, religion, gender,  or national origin, were clearly within the 
prohibited conduct of the rule.296  But the rule also prohibits 
“irrelevant references to personal characteristics” and “facial 
expressions and body language [that] convey to parties and lawyers 
in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and others an appearance of bias 
or prejudice.”297 
In assessing Judge Day’s use of a screening process, the Court 
upheld the commission’s determination that Day’s actions were 
 
290 See Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Day), 413 P.3d at 923. 
291 See id. at 912. 
292 Whitney Woodworth, State Dismisses Criminal Charges Against Suspended Judge Vance 
Day, SALEM STATESMAN J. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.statesmanjournal.com/story/news
/crime/2018/10/23/judge-vance-day-criminal-charges-dismissed-oregon/1744815002/.  The 
Oregon Supreme Court concluded, 
 
Day genuinely cared about the participants.  He put his “heart and soul” into the VTC, 
motivated by his desire to honor and assist veterans, not to promote his own interests.  He 
had “tremendous respect” for the participants, cared for them, and wanted to help their 
positive transition back to society.  The record also shows that respondent had a deep 
respect for, a sincere interest in, and a fascination with, military history and the work of 
the armed forces. 
 
Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Day), 413 P.3d at 916. 
293 See Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Day), 413 P.3d at 921–22. 
294 See id. at 951, 953. 
295 See id. at 951–52. 
296 See id. at 951. 
297 Id. 
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willful.298  The Court then upheld the recommended sanction against 
Judge Day and removed him from his judicial duties for a three year 
period.299  While the Court focused on Judge Day’s disregard for 
upholding the trust of his office, part of the basis for the Court’s 
lengthy sanction against Judge Day was to promote public confidence 
in the judiciary.300  Day appealed to the Supreme Court, but on 
October 9, 2018, the Court denied certiorari to his appeal.301 
While Judge Day is not solely responsible for widespread news 
reporting on his activities in the sense that he did not initiate 
interviews or contact media personnel, it must be noted that his 
conduct was widely reported in Oregon, and across the United 
States.302  The New York Post reported that Day had hung a picture 
of Hitler in his courtroom, but conceded that Day might have done 
this as a misunderstood honor to World War II veterans who defeated 
Nazi Germany.303  The state’s leading newspaper in terms of 
circulation, The Oregonian reported that Day’s suspension was the 
third longest in the state’s history.304  CBN News offered a defense of 
Day under the claim that his devout Christian faith was the target of 
the state judicial commission.305  By the end of 2015, Judge Day 
 
298 See id. at 953. 
299 See id. at 959.  The Court noted: “A suspension may be appropriate if a judge engages in 
misconduct directly related to the judge’s official duties, when the record shows that the judge 
does not ‘view[ ] the future in a manner materially different from the past.’”  Id. at 957 (citing 
In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 185, 210 (Or. 1994)). 
300 Id. at 959 (“We conclude that a lengthy suspension is required, to preserve public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”). 
301 See Day v. Or. Comm’n on Judicial Fitness & Disability, 139 S. Ct. 324 (2018); Suspended 
Oregon Judge Vance Day Strikes Out at U.S. Supreme Court, OREGONIAN (Oct. 9, 2018), https://
www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2018/10/suspended_oregon_judge
_vance_d.html. 
302 See, e.g., Aimee Green, Oregon Judge Vance Day Indicted for Allegedly Providing Gun to 
Felon, OREGONIAN (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news
/index.ssf/2016/11/oregon_judge_vance_day_indicte.html; Kim Davis Isn’t the Only One 
Refusing Same-Sex Marriages, USA TODAY (Sept. 5, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story
/news/nation-now/2015/09/05/kentucky-clerk-same-sex-marriage-license-religious-freedom
/71770124/; What Does It Mean to Be a Judge?, STATESMAN J. (Jan. 27, 2016), https://
www.statesmanjournal.com/story/opinion/2016/01/27/what-does-mean-judge/79364298/. 
303 See Meg Wagner, Oregon Judge Who Refused to Perform Same-Sex Marriages Hung 
Picture of Hitler in Courthouse, Bullied Veterans: Documents, N.Y. POST (Sept. 9, 2015), https://
www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ore-judge-hung-hitler-portrait-courthouse-bullied-vets-
article-1.2353159. 
304 See Aimee Green, Judge Vance Day—Who Wouldn’t Marry Same-Sex Couples— 
Suspended for 3 Years, OREGONIAN (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-
northwest-news/index.ssf/2018/03/oregon_supreme_court_xxxx_judg.html. 
305 See Mark Martin, Christian Judge Who Stood for Marriage May Fall to Deep Blue Liberal 
Agenda, CBN NEWS (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2017/april/oregon-judge-
fights-to-keep-his-job-blames-deep-blue-state-politics. 
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became emblematic of a so-called “culture war.”306  In February 2016, 
the Washington Post headlined an article with “Meet the judge who 
honors Hitler, hates gays, has ‘pattern of dishonesty.”307  One year 
later, the Washington Times headlined an editorial, “In Oregon, the 
left targets an Evangelical GOP judge.”308  People appearing in Judge 
Day’s courtroom, whether in a litigant, witness, juror, or observer 
capacity might well wonder if Judge Day had prejudged a case, even 
if he had entered into all cases with an internal determination to 
impartial and fair to all parties. 
Judge Day also published a brief law review essay in his own 
defense as well as a defense of Judge Neely, a Wyoming judicial 
officer who refused to perform same-sex marriages.309  Judge Day 
began his argument with the observation that “in a constitutional 
republic the institution responsible for adjudicating disputes and 
interpreting the application of the law must be held in high esteem 
by the society it serves.”310  He also recognized the importance of 
impartiality and pointed out that in 1346, Parliament, under King 
Edward III of England, enacted a statute mandating “equal Law and 
Execution of right to all our Subjects, rich and poor.”311  Yet, having 
recognized the importance of a judge’s impartial conduct, he argued 
that judicial disciplinary commissions and state supreme courts 
which upheld disciplinary recommendations have evolved from 
punishing actual transgressions to enforcing “conformity of 
thought.”312  He claimed he understood the importance of having a 
judiciary with a diversity of thought, but added that with Obergfell, 
some of the judicial ethics commissions applied a religious litmus test 
to the judiciary.313  Judge Day concluded his article with the 
 
306 See, e.g., Culture Wars, a Split America and an Oregon Judge Under Investigation, STATE 
(Sept. 5, 2015), https://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/article34225287.html. 
307 Tom Jackman, Meet the Judge Who Honors Hitler, Hates Gays, Has ‘Pattern of 
Dishonesty’, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp
/2016/02/29/meet-the-judge-who-honors-hitler-hates-gays-has-pattern-of-dishonesty/?utm
_term=.2152cd447278. 
308 Ralph Z. Hallow, In Oregon, the Left Targets an Evangelical GOP Judge, WASH. TIMES 
(Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/26/vance-day-evangelical-
judge-targeted-left-oregon/. 
309 See Vance R. Day, In re Neely: The “Pedestal Principle” and Judicial First Amendment 
Liberties in an Era of Increasing Thought Conformity, 30 REGENT U. L. REV. 119, 125, 133 
(2017). 
310 Id. at 119. 
311 Id. at 123. 
312 See id. at 127, 129–30. 
313 See id. at 128.  Judge Day noted that Justice Samuel Alito warned that Obergfell would 
result in discrimination against citizens whose religious beliefs were contrary to the decision.  
See id. at 128–29. 
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admonition that a judge’s liberty of conscience should be no more 
constrained than that of ordinary citizens.314  In a manner similar to 
Justice Mosk, Judge Day made an important argument about the 
basic constitutional rights of freedom of speech and conscience.315  
Like Justice Mosk, Judge Day’s argument did not consider how a 
judge’s overt conduct may effect a community’s internal biases and 
reinforce stereotypes and assumption that have a probability of 
undermining fair trials for litigants who come from disfavored 
backgrounds. 
In Neely v. Wyoming Commission on Judicial Conduct and 
Ethics,316 the Wyoming Supreme Court found the state commission’s 
recommendation to discipline Judge Ruth Neely from her judicial 
office after refusing to perform same-sex marriages was merited.317  
Judge Neely informed a local newspaper, the Pinedale Roundup, that 
her religious beliefs prevented her from performing same-sex 
marriages.318  The Wyoming Supreme Court articulated that its 
decision was not an appraisal of the legality of same-sex marriages, 
or the reasonableness of Judge Neely’s religious beliefs.319  Moreover, 
the state justices acknowledged that Judge Neely had continuously 
served as a part-time magistrate since 1994, a date prior to 
Obergefell, and had sought guidance from the state’s Judicial Ethics 
Advisory Committee before she knew of the commission’s 
investigation.320  However, in 2014, a United States District Court, in 
an unpublished order, enjoined Wyoming from enforcing any law or 
judicial rule that prohibited same-sex marriages.321  Thus, in addition 
to Obergfell, there was a federal district court order requiring the 
state to not only permit same-sex marriages, but also raise no 
barriers to the state’s citizens who wanted a same-sex marriage.322 
Judge Neely raised two arguments against her removal.323  The 
 
314 See id. at 133. 
315 See id. at 130. 
316 Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, 390 P.3d 728 (Wyo. 
2017). 
317 Id. at ¶ 1, 390 P.3d at 732.  Judge Neely was a part time magistrate.  Id. 
318 Id. at ¶ 9, 390 P.3d at 734. 
319 Id. at ¶¶ 3, 8, 390 P.3d at 732, 734.  The court accepted that Judge Neely’s religious 
beliefs were sincere and that her religious convictions served as a personal bar to her 
performing same-sex marriages.  Id. at ¶¶ 3, 8, 390 P.3d at 732, 733. 
320 See id. at ¶¶ 4, 10–11, 390 P.3d at 733, 734; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015) (decided June 26, 2015, 20 days after Judge Neely’s inquiry to the Judicial Ethics 
Advisory Committee). 
321 Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148481, at *21-22 (D. Wyo. 
Oct. 17, 2014). 
322 See id. 
323 Neely, 2017WY 25, ¶¶ 15, 31, 390 P.3d at 735, 739. 
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first was that her religious rights under the federal and state 
constitutions were protected against the type of judicial discipline 
imposed on her.324  Secondarily, because there were magistrates 
willing to perform same-sex marriages, her removal was not 
incompatible with further judicial service.325  The Wyoming Supreme 
Court determined that while Judge Neely had a constitutional right 
to her beliefs, Williams-Yulee held that the preservation of public 
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary was a compelling interest 
that required public censure.326  The state judiciary also noted that 
unlike other religious conviction decisions arising from mandatory 
societal functions such as public schools, judicial service requires a 
commitment to impartiality.327  The state supreme court reviewed 
Judge Neely’s conduct independent of the commission and 
determined that she had undermined the duty to promote confidence 
in the judiciary by evidencing a lack of impartiality and 
independence.328  However, the justices determined that permanent 
removal was too harsh of a remedy as it would “unnecessarily 
circumscribe protected expression,” and instead concluded that 
censure was more appropriate, coupled with an order to either 
perform same-sex marriages or no marriages at all.329 
A different result was reached by the Mississippi Supreme Court 
in 2004 in Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. 
Wilkerson.330  In 2002, Judge Connie Glenn Wilkerson published a 
letter in The George County Times in which he argued that 
“homosexuals belong in mental institutions.”331  In response to this 
letter and an ensuing complaint, the state judicial performance 
commission charged Judge Wilkerson with “conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice” and bringing his office into disrepute.332  
The state supreme court, however, placed paramountcy on the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech in reviewing Judge 
 
324 See id. at ¶ 15, 390 P.3d at 735. 
325 See id. at ¶ 31, 390 P.3d at 739. 
326 See id. at ¶¶ 1, 20, 390 P.3d at 732, 736 (citing Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 
1656, 1666 (2015)). 
327 See Neely, 2017 WY 25, at ¶ 36, 390 P.3d at 741 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
235–36 (1972)). 
328 See Neely, 2017 WY 25, at ¶ 66, 390 P.3d at 750. 
329 See id. at ¶¶ 75–76, 390 P.3d at 753. 
330 Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT (Miss. 2004). 
331 Id. at ¶¶ 2–3.  Based in Lucedale, Mississippi, the George County Times has been in 
continuous operation since 1904.  See GEORGE CTY. TIMES, http://www.gctimesonline.com/ (last 
visited March. 1, 2019). 
332 Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT (¶ 13). 
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Wilkerson’s actions.333  In doing so, the state justices emphasized 
Minnesota v. White over the Canons of Judicial Ethics’ goal of 
maintaining an impartial judiciary in both fact and appearance.334  
Moreover, the state justices framed Judge Wilkerson’s conduct as 
being a part of a larger political debate regarding gay rights.335  It is 
true that the state supreme court decided Wilkerson prior to 
Obergefell, and had Judge Wilkerson’s statements been directed 
specifically at same-sex marriage, the state’s justices would have 
been able to frame his conduct as part of an ongoing political and 
legal debate.336  But, Judge Wilkerson directed his public statements 
against a class of persons who constitute a percentage of Mississippi’s 
population, and it would be likely that a member of the class would 
appear in his courtroom.  The state supreme court also held that 
Judge Wilkerson’s statements constituted protected religious speech 
and any limitation on such speech constituted a prior restraint 
without a compelling interest.337  While the decision was issued prior 
to Yulee, it is important to point out that neither the majority nor 
dissenting opinions acknowledge that White involved the speech of a 
lawyer running for an elected judicial position, while Wilkerson 
involved the speech of a judicial officer who was currently serving in 
that capacity.338 
The Mississippi Supreme Court emplaced another flaw in 
Wilkerson by finding a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit analogous to the issue raised by Wilkerson’s behavior.339  The 
Fifth Circuit’s decision, Scott v. Flowers had nothing to do with a 
broad political issue.340  The underlying facts in Scott stem from an 
elected justice of the peace named James M. Scott, who took exception 
to a county court overturning his assessment of fines against persons 
charged with traffic infractions.341  Rather than file a complaint 
 
333 See id. at ¶ 7. 
334 See id. at ¶¶ 21–22 (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774–75 
(2002)). 
335 See Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT (¶ 23). 
336 Compare id. at ¶ 3 (in Wilkerson the court was asked to address speech that targeted the 
sexual orientation of some individuals), with Obergefell v. Hodges 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2588 (2015) 
(in Obergefell the court was asked to address the prohibition of same-sex marriage, not a 
person’s self-identification as homosexual). 
337 Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT (¶¶ 34, 44). 
338 Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1656 (2015); Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT 
(¶ 21) (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002)); Wilkerson, 
2002-JP-02105-SCT (¶¶ 66–67, 75) (Carlson, J. dissenting) (citing White, 536 U.S. at 774–78).   
339 See Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT (¶ 24) (citing Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 203 (5th 
Cir. 1990)) (labelling Flowers as a factually similar case). 
340 See Flowers, 910 F.2d at 203-04. 
341 See id. 
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through the judicial system, Scott authored an “open letter” to county 
officials decrying “an injustice in the administration of the county 
court system,” with a claim that “the county court system is not 
interested in justice.”342  After a local newspaper published the letter, 
and a county judge filed a complaint, the Texas Commission on 
Judicial Conduct issued a formal reprimand.343  However, the state 
commission did not document an instance where Scott had wrongly 
treated a traffic court litigant.344 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that it 
possessed jurisdiction over Scott’s lawsuit against the state 
commission because it found that the state commission’s censure 
constituted a judicial act, and this act implicated a First Amendment 
right of free speech.345  The appellate court next determined that 
Scott, even as a public employee, had a right to openly address 
matters of public concern that were not specific to the conditions of 
his own employment.346  That is, Scott had attempted to educate the 
county voters that the administration of justice, in his opinion, 
threatened the safety of the county, and as a result, the commission’s 
action could not withstand scrutiny.347  The best that can be said 
about the Mississippi Supreme Court’s analysis is that it championed 
the principle of transparency in noting that Judge Wilkerson did not 
hide his beliefs, and it indicated to him that he would likely face 
 
342 Id. at 203-04, 205. 
343 See id. at 204. 
344 See id. at 204-05. 
345 See id. at 205, 208-09. 
 
Thus, Scott had no vehicle other than a civil rights suit by which to challenge the 
Commission’s allegedly unconstitutional reprimand.  Although he could have elected to 
bring such an action in either state or federal court, his choice of the federal forum does 
not in any way suggest a deliberate circumvention of state court review.  We thus conclude 
that we have jurisdiction to consider Scott’s first amendment claims, and we now proceed 
to evaluate their merits. 
 
Id. at 208-09. 
346 Id. at 211 (quoting Moore v. Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 371 (5th Cir. 1989)). 
347 Scott, 910 F.2d at 211-13. 
 
Neither in its brief nor at oral argument was the Commission able to explain precisely how 
Scott’s public criticisms would impede the goals of promoting an efficient and impartial 
judiciary, and we are unpersuaded that they would have such a detrimental effect.  
Instead, we believe that those interests are ill served [sic] by casting a cloak of secrecy 
around the operations of the courts, and that by bringing to light an alleged unfairness in 
the judicial system, Scott in fact furthered the very goals that the Commission wishes to 
promote. 
 
Id. at 213. 
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recusal motions in the future.348  However, this places a burden on a 
litigant to challenge the judge.349 
On March 2, 2018, the United States District Court for the District 
of Alabama sided with Alabama Supreme Court Justice Tom Parker, 
and issued an injunction against the State Judicial Inquiry 
Commission from disciplining Parker on the basis of a speech that he 
made after Obergefell had been issued, but before the state supreme 
court determined whether Obergefell required state judicial officers 
to perform same-sex marriages.350  In 2015, during a radio interview, 
Parker challenged Obergfell’s constitutionality and suggested that 
Alabama could ignore Obergfell much as Wisconsin had once ignored 
Dred Scott.351  In 2018, Parker sought federal relief against the state 
commission because he was campaigning to be elected as the state’s 
chief justice, and he believed that his views on federalism and his 
arguments on Supreme Court overreach were valid campaign 
speech.352  The United States District Court agreed with Parker’s 
argument and issued an injunction against the commission.353  On 
November 6, 2018, Parker was elected chief justice.354  As a result, 
Parker was free, as a sitting judge, to not simply criticize the 
Supreme Court, but also to advocate for the disparate treatment of 
LGBT persons. 
C.  Race and National Origin 
Like sexual harassment, racially divisive judicial conduct has a 
deleterious effect on the fair adjudication of legal proceedings.355  Yet, 
there have been instances where state supreme courts have found a 
means to protect judicial appeals to racial divisions on the basis of 
 
348 Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 2002-JP-02105-SCT (¶¶ 3, 41) 
(Miss. 2004). 
349 See id. at ¶ 41. 
350 See Parker v. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n of Ala., 295 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1312 (M.D. Ala. 
2018); Obergefell v. Hodges 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015).  Prior to Obergefell, same-sex 
marriages were not recognized in Alabama and judges were prohibited from issuing marriage 
licenses.  See Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., 200 So. 3d 495, 500 (Ala. 2015); Parker, 
295 F. Supp. 3d at 1295. 
351 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); see Parker, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 1295–96. 
352 See Parker, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 1297. 
353 See id. at 1311. 
354 Samantha Michaels, Roy Moore’s Protégé Was Just Elected as Alabama’s Supreme Court 
Chief Justice, MOTHER JONES, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/10/roy-moore-tom-
parker-alabama-roe-v-wade-supreme-court-justice/ (last updated Nov. 6, 2018). 
355 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3 cmt. 1–3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (“A judge 
who manifests bias or prejudice in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and 
brings the judiciary into disrepute.”). 
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protected speech.  In 2003, in Griffen v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline 
and Disability Commission,356 the Arkansas Supreme Court quashed 
an admonishment of a judge who had encouraged the state 
legislature to consider withholding funds from the University of 
Arkansas.357  In 2002, Judge Wendell Griffen addressed the Arkansas 
Legislative Black Caucus after the university terminated the 
employment of a long-serving African-American athletic coach.358  
Judge Griffin asked the caucus members to consider that the 
termination decision was based on the coach’s race rather than the 
basketball team’s win-loss record, and that the firing was emblematic 
of racial inequities in the state.359  His proposed solution to the 
legislature was the withholding of funds from the university.360  In 
doing so, he intimated that a majoritarian Caucasian student 
population would feel the effects of defunding more than Arkansas’ 
African-American student population.361 
He defended himself by arguing that his statements were 
permitted as a matter of a judge consulting the legislative branch on 
a matter of personal interest and that his statements were also 
protected by the First Amendment.362  The Judicial Commission 
determined that Republican Party of Minnesota v. White only applied 
to elections and therefore Judge Griffen could be sanctioned.363  
However, the Arkansas Supreme Court found that White’s 
admonition against curtailing speech in the absence of a compelling 
interest meant the state rules governing judicial conduct also had to 
 
356 Griffen v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n, 130 S.W.3d 524 (2003). 
357 See id. at 538. 
358 See id. at 525–26. 
359 See id. at 526–27.  Judge Griffen stated, 
 
Our citizens are still paying, financially, emotionally, academically, and culturally, for 
inequities in public secondary education that followed the curse Governor Faubus left on 
our state.  . . .  Show them you will not support schools where black students, professors, 
and staff members are forced to watch their opportunities in higher education languish 
while their white counterparts enjoy most favored status at state expense.  Chancellor 
White and Frank Broyles say they fired Coach Richardson because they lack confidence in 
his leadership, despite the successful results he produced over the past seventeen years.  
Whether you believe them or not–and I do not believe them–send them a budgetary vote 
of no confidence concerning sorry leadership about racial inclusion over the past 130 years 
at the University of Arkansas.  SHOW THEM THE MONEY! 
 
Id. at 526–27. 
360 See id. at 526–27. 
361 See id. 
362 See id. at 528. 
363 See id. at 535. 
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clearly prohibit specific behavior.364  In this instance, the justices 
determined that the rule permitting legislative consulting was too 
vague to permit a penalty against the judge.365  The Arkansas 
Supreme Court’s decision is problematic because it fails to address 
limits on racially-based speech designed to deprive a class of people 
access to a basic institution.  What if a judge were to argue that the 
state university system had accepted too many members of an 
“undeserving” minority group at the expense of the rest of the state’s 
population?  Would the state supreme court have arrived at a 
different result? 
Another problematic decision was issued by the South Dakota 
Supreme Court in 2011.  In In re Fuller,366 the state justices reviewed 
the conduct of a long-serving judge which included the judge 
screaming at female clerks and calling an attorney an “asshole” in 
open court.367  His racial speech included instances where he took 
down Native American artwork from the courtroom walls when 
attorneys needed to use an image projector and while returning the 
artwork he informed the court, “this is where I hang my Indians.”368  
While the South Dakota Supreme Court forced Judge Fuller to accept 
retirement, they left open the possibility that he could return to the 
bench and noted: “[h]istory is replete with those who have overcome 
a weakness or character flaw and risen to what Attorney at Law 
Abraham Lincoln declared to be the ‘better angels of our nature.’”369  
Almost nine percent of South Dakota’s population is Native 
American,370 and would be reasonable to conclude that both Judge 
Fuller and the South Dakota Supreme Court had enabled a 
 
364 See id. at 536. 
365 See id.  It should be noted that most recently, Judge Griffen has been confronted with 
new allegations that he acted unethically as a judge.  In this instance, the judge participated 
in an anti-death penalty demonstration where he laid on a cot while clothed in prison garb.  See 
Max Brantley, Judge Griffen Moves to Dismiss Disciplinary Action, Cites Supreme Court 
Involvement, ARK. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives
/2019/04/05/judge-griffen-moves-to-dismiss-disciplinary-action-cites-supreme-court-
involvement.  Rather than remove Judge Griffen from his position as a judge, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court removed him from hearing death penalty cases.  See In re Kemp, 894 F. 3d 900, 
903 (8th Cir. 2018).  While there is nothing in Griffen’s later action that was directly based on 
conduct of a racial, sexist, or other discriminatory matter, it is clear that the earlier response 
of the state supreme court did not place the judge on sufficient notice to conform to judicial 
standards. 
366 In re Fuller, 2011 S.D. 22, 798 N.W.2d 408. 
367 See id. at ¶¶ 19–20, 798 N.W.2d at 413. 
368 Id. at ¶ 30, 798 N.W.2d at 415. 
369 Id. at ¶¶ 54, 55, 798 N.W.2d at 421, 422 (quoting In re Discipline of Laprath, 2003 S.D. 
114, ¶ 87, 670 N.W.2d 41, 66). 
370 See Quick Facts: South Dakota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts
/sd (last visited Mar. 14, 2019). 
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furthering of community harm by strengthening anti-Native 
American biases. 
There are state supreme courts which have placed the duty of 
impartiality above the concept of unbridled free speech.371  The 
Washington Supreme Court presents one example.  In In re 
Hammermaster, the state supreme court upheld a sanction against a 
judge who inquired into the legal status of Hispanic witnesses and 
defendants.372  The state commission recommended a censure and 
thirty day suspension against the judge, but the state supreme court 
ordered a censure and six month suspension.373  In Sanders v. 
Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct,374 the 
Washington Supreme Court, concerned with the “substantial basis 
and expectation that Justice Sanders would be in contact with 
possible litigants who had pending litigation before the court,” upheld 
a sanction against a state supreme court justice which included a 
public admonishment.375  The sanction arose, in part, from the 
justice’s visit to a sexual offender facility and meeting with 
defendants who had cases pending before the court.376  Given 
Washington’s progressive acceptance of the ills of implicit bias, it is 
unsurprising that the state supreme court would depart from a long-
standing norm that each justice on a court of final appeal has the sole 
authority to decide whether they should serve on a particular issue. 
New York also presents a system which recognizes that a judge’s 
racially divisive speech will not only undermine the judicial branch, 
it will also contribute to stigmatizing a group of people.377  In 1985, 
the Court of Appeals of New York determined that racism was 
incompatible with judicial service.378  In In re Mulroy,379 the New 
 
371 See In re Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924, 936 (Wash. 1999) (“Judicial independence does 
not equate to unbridled discretion to bully and threaten, to disregard the requirements of the 
law, or to ignore the constitutional rights of defendants.”). 
372 See id. at 941. 
373 See id. at 942, 943. 
374 In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanders, 145 P.3d 1208 (Wash. 2006). 
375 See id. at 1212–13.  Justice Sanders was no stranger to complaints and judicial 
disciplinary proceedings.  See In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanders, 955 P.2d 369, 377 
(Wash. 1998); Maureen O’Hagan, Justice Sanders Admonished for Ethics-Rules Violation, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 9, 2005), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/justice-sanders-
admonished-for-ethics-rules-violation/. 
376 See Sanders, 145 P.3d at 1209. 
377 See In re Agresta, 476 N.E.2d 285, 286 (N.Y. 1985). 
378 See id.  During sentencing proceedings, Judge Agresta, during a guilty plea colloquy, 
accused the defendant of not cooperating with the prosecution in regard to informing on his 
peers.  See id.  Justice Agresta stated: “I know there is another nigger in the woodpile.  I want 
that person out.  Is that clear?  What about that Mr. Blount?  You want to think it over?”  Id. 
379 In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d 120 (N.Y. 2000). 
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York Court of Appeals upheld the state commission’s determination 
to remove a judge who articulated racially disparaging remarks in 
describing the victim of a crime.380  While at a charity event, Judge J. 
Kevin Mulroy approached a prosecutor and began an ex parte 
discussion about a pending murder trial involving four defendants.381  
Although this type of ex parte conversation is generally considered a 
violation of a judge’s duty of impartiality, the contents of the 
conversation proved more troubling than the violation of the ex parte 
prohibition.382  Judge Mulroy urged the prosecutor to offer 
“reasonable” plea deals to the defendants before assuring the 
prosecutor that the community would not negatively react to such a 
deal since the sixty-seven year old murder victim was “just some old 
nigger bitch.”383  In a very brief decision, the appellate court 
determined that regardless of Judge Mulroy’s prior judicial record, 
this record could not be used to excuse or mitigate racial epithets or 
ethnic slurs in a quasi-official context and therefore, removal was the 
appropriate sanction.384 
In contrast to New York, in 2004, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
determined that the state judicial commission’s recommendation to 
suspend a judge without pay for one year was too severe of a 
punishment for the judge’s conduct.385  In 2003, Judge Timothy 
Ellender attended a Halloween costume party in which he and his 
spouse dressed as prisoners.386  During the party, the judge donned 
an “afro wig” and applied black makeup in a manner described as 
“blackface.”387  In early November, the local media reported the 
 
380 See id. at 121, 123.  It should be noted that Judge J. Kevin Mulroy was also accused of 
failing to act in an impartial manner and had advanced his personal influence through his 
judicial office.  See id. at 123.  One of the distinguishing features of Judge Mulroy’s appeal to 
the state’s highest appellate court was that it was accompanied by three amicus briefs.  See 
Brief of Amicus Curiae County Judges Ass’n of the State of New York, In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d 
120, 1999 WL 33659949 (arguing that the permanent removal of Judge Mulroy would curtail 
the independence of trial judges); Brief of Amicus Curiae Onondaga County Bar Ass’n Assigned 
Counsel Program, Inc., In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d 120, 1999 WL 33660417 (conceding that Judge 
Mulroy had made “a number of ill-advised and careless comments” but the sanction of a 
permanent removal was too severe); Brief of Amicus Curiae Syracuse Ass’n of Defense Lawyers 
on Behalf of Hon. J. Kevin Mulroy, In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d 120, 1999 WL 33659950 (arguing 
that a permanent removal would permit the government to “subject [judges] to unwarranted 
criticism”). 
381 See In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d at 121. 
382 See id. 
383 Id.  The appellate court noted that in a prior instance, Judge Mulroy denigrated Italian-
Americans.  Id. 
384 See id. at 123. 
385 In re Ellender, 04-2123, p. 5, 13 (La. 12/13/04); 889 So. 2d 225, 229, 234. 
386 Id. at p. 2, 889 So. 2d at 227. 
387 See id. 
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judge’s conduct, and shortly after, New Orleans’ television stations 
and CNN reported on the judge.388  Judge Ellender admitted to his 
conduct, but nevertheless “refuted the allegation that . . . called into 
question his . . . ability to be fair and impartial.”389  Further, Judge 
Ellender denied that he had portrayed African-Americans in a 
derogatory manner.390  The state judicial commission recommended 
the suspension of Judge Ellender without pay for a one year period.391 
Justice Chet Traylor, in writing the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
majority opinion, began by assuring the public that the state’s judges 
had be above reproach so that their conduct bolstered public 
confidence in the judiciary.392  The majority opinion not only upheld 
the suspension, it also required Judge Ellender to enroll in a 
university course focused on the effect of racism in society.393  Two 
justices dissented against the decision on the basis that Judge 
Ellender’s conduct was an isolated incident and that he had publicly 
apologized for it, and therefore the one-year suspension was 
excessive.394  Judge Ellender returned to his judicial position in 2005, 
but in 2009, he was suspended once more.395  This allegation of 
misconduct was based on discourteous conduct toward a female 
litigant in a hearing for a temporary restraining order brought by a 
wife on behalf of herself and her daughters; which indicated that 
because no physical abuse had occurred, Judge Ellender found there 
had been no wrongdoing and in which he admonished the wife for 
bringing an action for a temporary restraining order rather than 
divorce.396  Clearly, Judge Ellender, like Judge Kozinski, did not 
consider his previous discipline as being worthy of cognition.397 
There is another troubling aspect to Judge Ellender’s conduct.  A 
 
388 See id. 
389 See id. at p. 3–4, 889 So. 2d at 228. 
390 See id. 
391 See id. at p. 5, 889 So. 2d at 229. 
392 See id. at p. 9, 889 So. 2d at 231. 
393 See id. at p. 11–12, 13, 889 So. 2d at 233, 234.  The court found that Judge Ellender did 
not intend to offend any person and noted that an examination of Judge Ellender’s behavior 
demonstrated his inability to understand the magnitude of his actions.  See id. at p. 12, 889 So. 
2d at 233. 
394 See id. at p. 2, 3–4, 889 So. 2d at 234–35 (Victory, J., dissenting); id. at p. 1, 889 So. 2d 
at 235 (Hightower, J., dissenting). 
395 See In re Ellender, 09-0736, p. 8 (La. 07/01/09), 16 So. 3d 351, 356. 
396 See id. at p. 2–3, 6, 16 So. 3d at 353, 355.  This time, the Court upheld a thirty-day 
suspension for Judge Ellender and ordered him to undertake a domestic violence course.  Id. at 
p. 15, 16 So. 3d at 360; see also, Tom Planchet, Terrebone Judge Timothy Ellender Suspended 
Again, HOUMA TODAY (July 1, 2009), http://www.houmatoday.com/news/20090701/terrebonne-
judge-timothy-ellender-suspended-again (discussing Judge Ellender’s suspension). 
397  See In re Ellender, 09-0736, p. 13, 16 So. 3d at 358 (Judge Ellender argued that his past 
conduct was sufficiently different from the conduct under review in this instance). 
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small number of courts have recognized that the use of blackface can 
constitute an act of racism, even when done as a parody.398  In Tindle 
v. Caudell, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined 
that the employment termination of a police officer who appeared in 
“blackface” at a private Halloween party did not violate the officer’s 
First Amendment rights.399  However, a decade earlier, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Berger v. Battaglia,400 determined 
that the use of “blackface” for the purposes of public parody, would 
not justify the termination a police officer’s employment since the act 
was protected by the First Amendment.401  The Fourth Circuit 
recognized that a police officer’s use of blackface in an open setting in 
which the officer performed an Al Jolson rendition, could be an 
affront to the relevant community, in this case, a portion of 
Baltimore’s population, but the population’s right to confront the 
officer was through peaceful protest.402 
D.  Sexism and Sexual Harassment: “Locker Room Talk” 
In contrast to judicial conduct relating to LGBT persons, several 
state commissions and state supreme courts have shown strength in 
disciplining judges who engage in sexist behavior.403  This section 
concentrates on sexist behavior of a not physically assaultive nature.  
Judicial behavior which fits within the definition of a crime is likely 
to result in a finding that the offending judge is not fit—whether 
temporarily or permanently—to serve in a judicial capacity.404  For 
instance, a judge who publicly shoves his spouse during an argument 
may be suspended until the judge completes a domestic violence 
program.405  There are, however, questions as to whether a judge who 
sexually harasses or demeans office staff may be suspended or 
removed for such conduct, or, for that matter evidences a bias against 
women.406 
 
398  See, e.g., Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1995). 
399 Id. at 968, 973. 
400 Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985). 
401 Id. at 1001. 
402 Id. at 994, 1001. 
403 See In re Carpenter, 17 P.3d 91, 92, 95 (Ariz. 2001); In re Assini, 720 N.E.2d 882, 883, 
885–86 (N.Y. 1999) (per curiam); Kennick v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 787 P.2d 591, 
593, 605 (Cal. 1990). 
404 See generally Code of Conduct for United States Judges, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourt 
s.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (“A judge 
should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes 
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”). 
405 In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Turco, 970 P.2d 731, 733 (Wash. 1999). 
406 Compare In re Gordon, 917 P.2d 627, 627 (Cal. 1996) (finding a public reprimand through 
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Although this Article focuses on state judicial conduct, there is a 
federal judicial example that presents warnings as to the danger of 
not adequately sanctioning judges who act in a sexist manner.407  In 
2009, Chief Justice John Roberts convened a special panel composed 
of the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit to investigate the conduct 
of Judge Alex Kozinski, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit.408  An attorney had informed The Los Angeles 
Times that Kozinski had pornography on his website and then 
formally issued a complaint against Kozinski.409  Judge Kozinski 
maintained a website which contained “‘a photo of naked women on 
all fours painted to look like cows,’ ‘a video of a half-dressed man 
cavorting with a sexually aroused farm animal,’ and ‘a graphic step-
by-step pictorial in which a woman is seen shaving her pubic hair.’”410  
Kozinski admitted to maintaining the images on his website but 
testified that he believed the website was for private storage purposes 
and therefore not available to the public.411  After a detailed analysis, 
the Third Circuit’s special panel concluded that an admonishment 
was sufficient to resolve the complaint.412  While the investigation 
and subsequent action of the investigation were purely a federal 
matter, the outcome evidences that an admonishment for a judge 
collecting and showing electronic displays demeaning to women may 
not be enough of a deterrent against undermining impartiality in the 
future.  In 2017, six former law clerks and administrative personnel 
accused Judge Kozinski of sexual misbehavior.413  By the end of that 
year, another nine women accused him of similar conduct.414  On 
December 18, 2017, Judge Kozinski retired from his judicial duties 
 
the issued decision as the appropriate response for the judge’s “sexually suggestive remarks”), 
with In re Seaman, 627 A.2d 106, 108–109, 124 (N.J. 1993) (finding a sixty-day suspension and 
a required sexual harassment educational program to be a proper punishment for sexual 
harassment). 
407 See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 575 F.3d 279, 295 (3d Cir. 2009). 
408 See id. at 279–80, 283. 
409 Id. at 281. 
410 Id. 
411 Id. 
412 See id. at 295. 
413  See Matt Zapotosky, Federal Appeals Judge Announces Immediate Retirement Amid 
Probe of Sexual Misconduct Allegations, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/federal-appeals-judge-announces-immediate-
retirement-amid-investigation-prompted-by-accusations-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/12/18
/6e38ada4-e3fd-11e7-a65d-1ac0fd7f097e_story.html?utm_term=.4bf64705342d. 
414 See Matt Zapotosky, Nine More Women Say Judge Subjected Them to Inappropriate 
Behavior, Including Four Who Say He Touched or Kissed Them, Wash. Post (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nine-more-women-say-judge-
subjected-them-to-inappropriate-behavior-including-four-who-say-he-touched-or-kissed-them
/2017/12/15/8729b736-e105-11e7-8679-a9728984779c_story.html?utm_term=.a816354b06d0. 
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and was effectively removed from taking part in further judicial 
activities.415 
In contrast to the federal judicial council investigation into Judge 
Kozinski,416 the West Virginia Supreme Court, in 1995, determined 
that a judge’s removal from the bench and suspension of his license 
to practice law was an appropriate sanction for using lewd language 
to a female court employee as well as touching her without her 
consent.417  However, in this decision, the judge entered into an 
agreement with the state judicial commission in which he would not 
contest the sanctions against him including a $10,000 fine.418  A 
decade later, the state supreme court determined that a one-year 
suspension was appropriate for a magistrate who propositioned four 
female litigants.419 
The Montana Supreme Court, in Harris v. Smartt,420 upheld the 
removal of a judicial officer who downloaded pornographic images 
onto his state-owned computer.421  In that decision, a justice of the 
peace was found to have maintained pornography in his chambers 
and this pornography was discovered as a result of a computer 
administrator trying to diagnose a computer error.422  The state 
supreme court recognized that Montana’s constitution afforded 
greater privacy rights and free speech protections than the Federal 
Constitution, but then concluded the judicial officer violated his duty 
of impartiality in fact and appearance.423  Moreover, the state justices 
noted that that the judicial officer’s behavior garnered considerable 
media attention.424  While the state judicial commission 
 
415 See Zapotosky, supra note 414.  
416 See Matt Zapotosky, Judiciary Closes Investigation of Sexual Misconduct Allegations 
Against Retired Judge Alex Kozinski, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/national-security/judiciary-closes-investigation-of-sexual-misconduct-allegations-
against-retired-judge-alex-kozinski/2018/02/05/e3a94bb8-0ac0-11e8-95a5-c396801049ef_story
.html?utm_term=.f0c37ebea6c9.  
417 See In re Hey, 457 S.E.2d 509, 510–11, 514, 515 (W. Va. 1995). 
418 See id. at 511, 515.  The maximum discipline available in West Virginia was $5,000.  Id. 
at 514. 
419 See In re Toler, 625 S.E.2d 731, 735, 740 (W. Va. 2005). 
420 Harris v. Smartt, 2002 MT 239, 311 Mont. 507, 57 P.3d 58, vacated 2003 MT 135, 316 
Mont. 130, 68 P.3d 889. 
421 See id. at ¶¶ 13, 21. 
422 See id. at ¶¶ 17–18.  It must be noted that the judicial officer was also investigated for 
sexual assault.  See State ex rel. Smartt v. Judicial Standards Comm’n, 2002 MT 148, ¶ 5, 310 
Mont. 295, 50 P.3d 150. 
423 Smartt, ¶¶ 65, 77, 82 (citing State v. Sheetz, 950 P.2d 722, 724 (Mont. 1995); Gryczan v. 
State, 942 P.2d 112, 121 (Mont. 1997); State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 183 (Mont. 1997); State v. 
Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 75 (Mont. 1995)). 
424 Harris, ¶ 83.  See Commission Urges JP’s Ouster, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Nov. 30, 2001), 
https://billingsgazette.com/news/local/commission-urges-jp-s-ouster/article_ca303793-3376-
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recommended a permanent suspension from office and Montana’s 
supreme court adopted this recommendation, it is noteworthy that 
the state justices found that there was a deleterious effect on the 
public’s view of the state judiciary, and the judicial officer’s claim that 
“he was composing a joke birthday card for his wife,” did not 
constitute a defense in this instance.425  It is also noteworthy that one 
justice, James Nelson, concurred in the decision but with the caveat 
that the state’s judicial ethics canons had to be strengthened and 
given greater prohibitory precision.426 
The Montana Supreme Court is by no means alone in assessing the 
impact of sexism on the bench to both the judiciary and society.  In 
2015, Pennsylvania’s Judicial Conduct Board filed a complaint 
alleging that Justice J. Michael Eakin had abused his authority by 
forwarding numerous e-mails that contained statements that were 
derogatory in their gender, racial, and ethnic content.427  Many of the 
forwarded e-mails were sent from a state computer.428  In between 
the board’s determination and Justice Eakin’s appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, he resigned.429  The e-mails contained 
images of nude and semi-nude women accompanied by “jokes based 
on negative social and gender stereotypes.”430  The state supreme 
court determined that “the ‘appearance of impropriety’” standard 
extended to off-duty conduct, though it found that Justice Eakin’s use 
of a government computer rendered the distinction between off-duty 
and on-duty conduct irrelevant.431  Because Eakin had resigned from 
 
5e27-b792-af375a231144.html; JP Collects Full Pay as Case Is Debated, BILLINGS GAZETTE 
(July 5, 2002), https://billingsgazette.com/news/local/jp-collects-full-pay-as-case-is-debated
/article_f9c7858d-bb32-53dd-a431-b1716c12030a.html; Smartt ‘Not Fit’ to Be Judge, 
Commission’s Lawyer Says, MONT. STANDARD (Feb. 14, 2002), https://mtstandard.com/news
/state-and-regional/smartt-not-fit-to-be-judge-commission-s-lawyer-says/article_08cea4b8-
8f22-50ed-ad25-a8ee617439a7.html. 
425 See Smartt, ¶¶ 1, 83–84. 
426 See id. at ¶ 89 (Nelson, J., concurring).  Another justice, Karla Gray, concurred with the 
majority’s analysis but dissented from the majority’s determination to suspend the judicial 
officer ten days after the decision’s issuance.  See id. at ¶ 117 (Gray, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Justice Gray argued that permanent removal should have taken immediate 
effect.  Id.  However, one dissenting justice not only pointed out the evidence used in the 
proceeding constituted a violation of the judicial officer’s privacy rights, but also, that the 
pornographic images were private use.  See id. at ¶¶ 131 147 (Treiweiler, J., dissenting) 
(“Smartt simply viewed material in the privacy of his office which most people consider 
offensive.  For that, his job has been taken away.  God protect us from the wrath of the 
righteous.”). 
427 In re Eakin, 150 A.3d 1042, 1045 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Discipline 2016). 
428 See id. at 1049. 
429 See id. at 1046. 
430 Id. at 1051. 
431 See id. at 1056, 1057 (quoting In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529 (Pa. 1992)). 
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the court, he could no longer be removed.432  Nonetheless, the court 
found that Justice Eakin’s conduct merited a penalty.433  The basis 
for the penalty, as the court noted, was that the forwarded e-mails 
embodied “beliefs [that] are antithetical to the privilege of holding 
public office, where the charge is to serve, not demean, our 
citizens.”434 
In 2011, the Arizona Supreme Court censured and permanently 
enjoined Judge Theodore Abrams from holding further judicial office 
after it was discovered that he had engaged in an ongoing intimate 
relationship with one female attorney who frequently appeared in his 
court, and harassed another female attorney who had spurned his 
advances.435  Judge Abrams did not notify opposing counsel of his 
relationship with the attorney he was involved with, which violated 
a separate judicial canon.436  As for his harassment of the second 
attorney, the court noted that he had “demean[ed] and humiliat[ed] 
her,” and “injured the legal system by exploiting his judicial position 
in pursuit of sexual gratification.”437  However, although the 
prohibition appears to be a blanket condemnation of judicial sexual 
harassment, it must be noted that Judge Abrams had already 
resigned at the time of the decision.438 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In 2015, a study found that prosecutors in Caddo Parrish, 
Louisiana exercised peremptory challenges against African-
American jurors at three times the rate that non-black jurors were 
struck.439  Despite the Court’s admonition in Batson,440 it is clear that 
there is a discriminatory practice against African-American jurors in 
one part of Louisiana.  While it is difficult to draw a direct line from 
Judge Timothy Ellender’s conduct to that of prosecutors who 
 
432 In re Eakin, 150 A.3d at 1061 (“[W]e substantially and significantly reduce . . . the 
sanction given Respondent’s . . . resignation.”). 
433 See id. 
434 Id. (“With their imagery of sexism, racism, and bigotry, is arrogance and the belief that 
an individual is better than his or her peers.”). 
435 In re Abrams, 257 P.3d 167, 168, 174–75 (Ariz. 2011). 
436 See id. at 168.  The canon Judge Abrams violated was Code of Judicial Conduct: Rule 
2.11, “failing to disqualify himself ‘in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.’”  Id. at 170. 
437 Id. at 171. 
438 Id. at 169. 
439 Alexandria Burris, Black Jurors More Likely to be Struck from Caddo Juries, 
SHREVEPORT TIMES, (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/news/local/2015
/08/17/black-jurors-likely-struck-caddo-juries/31852745/. 
440 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1986). 
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routinely exercise peremptory challenges against minorities, it 
cannot be missed that Ellender was not removed from the bench after 
disparaging African-Americans.441  Had the state judicial disciplinary 
agency or the Louisiana Supreme Court applied a community harm 
standard to Ellender and removed him, it at least would have sent a 
signal to the prosecutors that racism against minorities has no place 
in the charging of crimes or the prosecution’s adjudicatory functions.  
Removal may have also brought greater confidence to Louisiana’s 
population that the judiciary would follow its own goal of colorblind 
impartiality. 
It is true that a judge possess the same free speech rights as does 
the general citizenry, but various rights, in particular, freedom of 
speech, may be curtailed by the fundamental demands of the twin 
duties of impartiality and independence.442  It is true that the 
Supreme Court has held that a state or the federal government enjoys 
greater latitude to regulate speech when it acts in its capacity as an 
employer.443  However, the Court has also distinguished the judiciary 
from normal employment.444  Although well before the 2016 election 
judges had been discovered to have engaged in sexual harassment, 
articulated racially disparaging comments, or evidenced hostility to 
gays, lesbians, and transgendered (LGBT) persons, there has been a 
rise in the political targeting of minorities (including certain religious 
minorities) and LGBT persons since that time.445 
A trial litigant, whether in a civil or criminal trial, is entitled to a 
jury that is not predisposed to a result based on racial, religious, or 
gender bias.446  The same rule holds true for judges.  A litigant is 
 
441 In re Ellender, 04-2123, p. 12 (La. 12/13/04), 889 So. 2d 225, 233, 234. 
442 See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665–66 (2015). 
443 See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 
378, 384 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 
563, 568 (1968). 
444 Compare Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1665 (applying strict scrutiny where a candidate 
for judicial office challenges First Amendment violations), with Waters, 511 U.S. at 668 (quoting 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983)) (applying a specialized standard of review, “the 
Connick test” for other government employees). 
445 See e.g., Mark Berman, Hate Crimes in the United States Increased Last Year, the FBI 
Says, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017
/11/13/hate-crimes-in-the-united-states-increased-last-year-the-fbi-says/?utm_term=
.1e61356a370a; Sam Petulla et al., The Number of Hate Crimes Rose in 2016, CNN (Nov. 13, 
2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/13/politics/hate-crimes-fbi-2016-rise/index.html.  In terms 
of crimes against religious minorities, there has been a rise of crimes against Muslims in the 
United States since the election.  See e.g., Katayoun Kishi, Assaults Against Muslims in U.S. 
Surpass 2001 Level, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.pewrese arch.org/fact-
tank/2017/11/15/assaults-against-muslims-in-u-s-surpass-2001-level/. 
446 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85–86 (1986) (citing Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 
321 (1906); Ex parte Va., 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)). 
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entitled to challenge a juror for cause as well as a judge.447  Some 
jurisdictions extend the “appearance of impropriety” standard to 
recusal.448  However, no rule of judicial ethics exists which takes into 
account how a judge’s public or known private conduct might affect 
the right to a fair trial by strengthening a community’s implicit 
biases.449  One means to curtail this possibility is to make the removal 
of judges who engage in sexist, racist, or other bigoted acts more 
likely.  Some states, such as Oregon, New York, and Washington have 
taken a step in this direction.450  But, most of the state supreme 
courts have not.451  And, while it appears that there is less tolerance 
for sexism in the courts, and a few states have removed judicial 
officers who refused to perform same-sex marriages,452 there remains 
inequities in judicial discipline and tolerance for derogatory conduct 
toward minority groups.453  In the end, assessing judicial misconduct 
not only against the current standards of judicial canons of ethics, 
but also by adding considerations of community harm will enable a 
state judicial system to better protect the integrity of its judicial 
system by instilling long-term public confidence and wider 
participation in it. 
 
447 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (West 2018). 
448 See, e.g., Ex parte Bryant, 682 So. 2d 39, 41 (Ala. 1996); Tennant v. Marion Health Care 
Found, 459 S.E.2d 374, 385 (W. Va. 1995). 
449 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.3 (prohibiting judges from “manifesting 
bias,” but does not discuss how judicial conduct may impact community biases). 
450 See In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d 120, 121, 123 (N.Y. 2000); Inquiry Concerning a Judge 
(Day), 413 P.3d 907, 959 (Or. 2018); In re Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924, 927, 943 (Wash. 1999). 
451 See In re Ellender, 04-2123, p. 13 (La. 12/13/04), 889 So. 2d 225, 234; Bob Egelko, Court 
Commissioner Disciplined for Abusive Behavior Toward Interpreter, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Court-commissioner-disciplined-for-abusive-
12253514.php (describing a judge with a history of making sexist and racist comments who was 
repeatedly disciplined but not removed from the bench). 
452 See Pete Williams, Wyoming Judge Faces Removal for Refusing Same-Sex Marriages, 
NBC NEWS (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/wyoming-judge-faces-
removal-refusing-same-sex-marriages-n632906; ‘Not Going to Miss the Ayatollah of Alabama’: 
State’s Chief Justice Removed in Gay-Marriage Dispute, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.baltimoresun.com/news/nation-world/ct-alabama-justice-suspended-over-gay-marriage-
stance-20160930-story.html. 
453 Compare In re Ellender, 04-2123, p. 13, 889 So. 2d at 234 (finding one-year suspension, 
with six months deffered if the Judge completed racial sensitivity training, adequate), with In 
re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d at 123 (finding removal appropriate). 
